英文摘要
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This article studies the veto power which resides in Taiwan's local governments both from the legal/ institutional and empirical perspectives. Three related Acts that have regulated local veto power since 1994 are examined in this study. They are: the Self-Governance Act for Provinces and Counties (SGAPC, 1994), the Self-Governance Act for Special Municipalities (SGASM, 1994), and the Local Government Act (LGA, 1999) that has integrated the two SGAs and become the currently enacted law. The article explores whether the regulations regarding veto power drawn from the two SGAs, as well as the LGA, and their consecutive implementation in practice, have been able to achieve the theoretical goals designated in veto power, i.e., to protect administrative power, on the one hand, and to improve the quality of legislation, on the other. After analyzing these three Acts and comparatively examining their realization between 1994 to 1999 and 2000 to 2010, the article uncovers the followings: First, although the veto power institution resided in LGA has been doing a better job than that in the two SGAs in terms of protecting administrative power, its practical function has not been as effective as that of the veto power institution designated by the American presidential system, which is the so-called model of dual democracy. Second, some regulations in the LGA that seemingly are intended to protect the administration have not really been beneficial to it in practice. Furthermore, some of them may be obscure in nature, and have, in fact, resulted in some confusion and debate when enacted. Neither have these kinds of rules been able to improve the quality of legislation. Third, the effective use of the veto power by the local administration has been limited to the countries & cities that are not subject to active factions or black money activities. In sum, if the veto power, as designated, aims to protect the administration, some ambiguities residing in the current LGA's regulations should be further clarified. Some regulations that are well intended but not substantially beneficial to the administrative power in practice may also need to be adjusted. This artlcle then provides four suggestions for the consideration of future LGA revisions.
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