遼、宋、北漢對「雄州和議」之認知

Perceptions of Liao, Song, and Northern Han toward the Peace Accord of Xiongzhou

10.29457/SJH.201112.0001

朱奕嵐(Yi-Lan Chu)

雄州和議 ； 認知 ； 緩衝體系 ； 北漢 ； 遼 ； 宋 ； Peace Accord of Xiongzhou ； Perception ； Buffer system ； Northern Han ； Liao ； Song

東吳歷史學報

26期（2011 / 12 / 31）

1 - 46

繁體中文

代表宋遼初次和解合意之「雄州和議」，即便存續時間短暫，確實使得宋遼關係正式對等正常化，對於解決五代以來遼與中原政權之間的衝突而言，有其重要性。然而，「雄州和議」終究未能化解遼、宋與北漢間之矛盾而弭兵止戰。三方在「雄州和議」成立之後仍衝突不斷，以至於北漢在979年降宋，宋遼旋即進入全面戰爭狀態。以體系觀點切入，本文認為遼、宋與北漢在「和議之範圍」、「體系之現狀」以及「對他行動者之行為預期」之認知上，彼此具備矛盾性與衝突性，進而產生認知上之不協調。遼明顯偏好現狀穩定，認為「雄州和議」應包括北漢，宋不應該再攻北漢，而北漢不得挑釁；北漢雖然亦偏好現狀，但認為「雄州和議」未包含宋與北漢之關係，而宋將繼續來襲；宋雖然似乎願意與遼建立和平，但不偏好北漢存在之現狀，且以擊滅北漢為國家統一之重要目標。此等認知上之不協調，使三方行動者，特別是體系主導強權的遼與宋，未能利用雙方和議之契機，共同穩定三邊緩衝關係之現狀與體系內行動者間之和平。

The Peace Accord of Xiongzhou of AD975, which represented the first reconciliation between Song Dynasty and Liao Dynasty, did normalize the relationship between Song and Liao for a very short period of time. The Peace Accord, therefore, was significant in reconciling the persisting conflicts during the period of Five Dynasties (AD907-979) between Liao and regimes of the Central Plain of China. However, the Peace Accord of Xiongzhou eventually did not resolve the armed conflicts between Liao and the Kingdom of Northern Han, on the one hand, and Song on the other. The prolong war between Song and Northern Han did not cease and Northern Han at last surrendered to Song in AD979; Song and Liao immediately went into a full-scale war against each other for years.From the viewpoint of systemic analysis, this article argues that discrepancies and conflicts of the perceptions existed as to the geographic scope of the Peace Accord of Xiongzhou, the status quo, and the expectations about other actors' actions. Liao obviously preferred the status quo with Song, expected Northern Han as a stable buffer state. Liao further held that the Peace Accord should include Northern Han, and both Song and Han should not attack each other from then on. Northern Han also preferred the status quo in which Northern Han could exist with the support from Liao. But Northern Han did not take part in the Peace Accord governing or resolving the relationship between Song and herself. Northern Han believed that Song would keep waging war for Northern Han's annihilation. Although willing to have peace with Liao in AD974, Song did not prefer the buffer system in which Northern Han's existence could be assured. For Song, conquering Northern Han was one of the major objectives for the national unity. These inconsistencies of perceptions made the actors within the system, especially Liao and Song as the system dominants, unable or unwilling to take the opportunity brought by the Peace Accord of Xiongzhou to stabilize the status quo jointly and to make peace between them.

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