企業的管理者類型與更換會計師之研究：考量公司治理及法律責任觀點

The Study on Manager Type of Firm and Auditor Switching: The Issue of Corporate Governance and Legal Liability

王茂昌(Mao-Chang Wang)；邱士宗(Shih-Tsung Chiu)

管理者類型 ； 更換會計師 ； 公司治理 ； Manager Type ； Auditor Switching ； Corporate Governance

企業管理學報

76期（2008 / 03 / 01）

21 - 53

繁體中文

本研究旨在分析於建立及落實公司治理與落實管理者及會計師的法律責任環境下，對不同的管理者類型與更換會計師之影響，以瞭解管理者及會計師的策略選擇。假設當不同的管理者類型面臨高風險投資專案且須向外部募集資金時，管理者及會計師的報導策略之兩期賽局模型，並運用反向歸納法推導其均衡條件及結果。研究發現管理者是專業經理人時，則會計師較易維持獨立性且管理者較易誠實報導；另建立及落實公司治理與落實管理者及會計師的法律責任時，企業經營權與所有權分離程度愈高時，愈能減少管理者及會計師勾結行為的誘因，促使管理者誠實報導並能維持會計師的獨立性。

The main purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of various manager types of firm and the auditor switching in the environment of implementing the corporate governance as well as increasing the manager's and the auditor's legal liabilities, and understand the strategies that are chosen by the manager and the auditor. We suppose the manager must raise funds outside to complete a risky project in various manager types of firm, and we consider a two period game theoretical model between the manager and the auditor. The backward induction concept is applied to derive the possible equilibrium and conditions to sustain them. Our main results are: it is easier to maintain auditor independence and to induce the manager to report honestly if the firm's management composed of professional managers. In the environment of implementing corporate governance and increasing the manager's and the auditor's legal liabilities, the more the firm separates its management and ownership, the less the collusion between the manager and the auditor, and it will lead the auditor to maintain independence and the manager to report honestly.

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