供應鏈的合作與不合作廣告策略之賽局研究

Game-theoretic Approach for Cooperative and Non-cooperative Advertising Strategies in a Supply Chain

10.29847/JNUU.201106.0007

許晉雄(Chin-Hsiung Hsu)；鄒慶士(Ching-Shih Tsou)；葉清江(Ching-Chiang Yeh)

供應鏈 ； 合作性廣告 ； 賽局理論 ； 史達克柏格 ； 聶許 ； Supply chain ； Cooperative advertising ； Game theory ； Stackelberg ； Nash

聯大學報

8卷1期（2011 / 06 / 01）

135 - 154

繁體中文

合作性廣告屬於通路的協調(channel coordination)活動，通路協調在行銷領域中已有許多相關研究，但大多數的研究均環繞著與價格相關的議題上，而合作性廣告投資較少被完整的探討。在合作性廣告之中，製造商與零售商必須一起去做全國性的品牌廣告投資與地區性產品廣告投資。不同權力結構之下，可能影響到其補貼的意願與程度，也會影響各自投資程度。在本研究中以史達克柏格(Stackelberg)、聶許(Nash)與談判理論(bargaining)等賽局均衡概念，探討在不同權力之下，全國性廣告、地區性廣告、補貼程度、各自報酬與系統報酬上的差異。在求得合作與不合作賽局的均衡(equilibrium)解後，我們也可以藉此了解，雙方的邊際報酬，會影響到雙方策略的執行，當製造商邊際報酬比較高時，他才願意去做補貼政策；如果同時行動時，製造商也會因追求各自報酬最大化，不願意做補貼執行。另外，為了避免成為零合賽局，雙方之間必然要有一個談判的機制去運作，經過談判的結果，才能夠在合作下去讓系統報酬最大化，而達到柏拉圖有效率的結果。

Cooperative advertising is one kind of channel coordination activities that have been extensively studied by marketing researchers. Most of these studies focused on price-related issues, however, cooperative advertising was seldom found recently. In a cooperative advertising arrangement, manufacturer and retailer must agree to invest on national and local advertising, either funding by themselves or covered by subsidy from other player. Different power structure may influence their subsidy level and their own investment. In this paper, the game of Stackelberg, Nash, and bargaining theory were used to analyze the cooperative advertising relationship. After solving the cooperative and uncooperative equilibrium, different aspects on national advertising, local advertising, subsidy level, each player's profit and system profit were discussed subsequently. The results show that each player's own strategy is influenced by their marginal profit. To avoid the result of a zero sum game, both players could cooperate through a bargaining mechanism that will attain the maximum system profit and achieve the Pareto efficiency.

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