题名

家族集團股權結構與家族領導雙元性對「主理人－主理人」代理問題之探討

并列篇名

The Impact of Ownership Structure and Family Leadership Duality on Principal-Principal Agency Problems in Family Business Groups

DOI

10.6147/JHRM.201912_19(2).0002

作者

盧逸君(Yi-Chun Lu)；詹淑婷(Shu-Ting Chan)；蘇怡方(I-Fang Su)；鍾喜梅(Hsi-Mei Chung)

关键词

「主理人－主理人」代理問題 ； 資源依賴理論 ； 家族集團 ； 金字塔股權結構 ； 家族領導雙元性 ； principal-principal agency problem ； resource dependence theory ； family business group ； pyramidal ownership structure ； family leadership duality

期刊名称

人力資源管理學報

卷期/出版年月

19卷2期（2019 / 12 / 01）

页次

29 - 55

内容语文

繁體中文
中文摘要

家族集團透過金字塔股權結構，形成股份控制權與盈餘分配權不相當的分離現象而導致剝削誘因，即為代理理論所指「主理人－主理人」代理問題。然家族成員除直接持股分子企業外，亦可透過核心公司或集團內其他分子企業間接持股以達控制。本研究透過1996～2004年共17個台灣家族集團、371間分子企業之縱橫資料，以多層混和效果最大概似模型（multilevel mixed-effects maximum likelihood model, ML model）探討股權結構對集團分子企業的「主理人－主理人」代理意涵；並結合資源依賴觀點，討論集團領導人與分子企業領導人的親屬關係（家族領導雙元性），對於調和股權結構與此一代理問題的影響。研究發現，家族領導雙元性得減緩家族成員直接持股或透過核心公司持股集團分子企業造成的「主理人－主理人」代理問題。
英文摘要

Agency theory argues that the differential ownership structure inside a family business group will generate distinctive agency problems or performance consequence. In that, the higher degree of pyramidal ownership structure will generate greater divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights, and thus the higher level of principal-principal agency problem in the affiliated firms in a family business group will be. Employing agency and resource dependence perspective, this study tries to examine the principal-principal agency problem from the distinctive ownership control type (direct ownership, the ownership of the core firm, and the ownership from other affiliates) by considering the condition of family leadership duality in family business groups. With longitudinal data of Taiwanese family business groups from 1996 to 2004, including 371 firms from 17 groups, this study adopts multilevel mixed-effects maximum likelihood model (ML model) to find out that family leadership duality cast moderation effect with family direct ownership and the ownership of the core firm on the affiliated firm to alleviate the principal-principal agency problem in the affiliated firms.
主题分类 社會科學 > 心理學
社會科學 > 社會學
社會科學 > 經濟學
社會科學 > 管理學
社會科學 > 法律學
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