Global Sufficientarianism Reconsidered

全球足夠主義的再思

10.6683/TPSR.201406.18(1).181-226

郭祐輑(Yu-chun Kuo)

global justice ； world poverty ； sufficiency ； basic needs ； capabilities ； 全球正義 ； 全球貧窮 ； 足夠主義 ； 基本需求 ； 能力理論

台灣政治學刊

18卷1期（2014 / 06 / 01）

181 - 226

英文

Faced with the current misery of world poverty, a group of scholars have recently argued that global distributive justice should aim at improving the condition of the poor up to a threshold of sufficiency, instead of eliminating the unequal distribution of goods and resources between the poor and the rich or giving priority to alleviating the predicament of the worse-off. In this paper, by analyzing the justification of the state system, I develop an account of sufficientarianism that highlights basic needs as the sufficiency threshold because of their importance to people's private and political lives. In addition, I suggest three further standards (empirical necessity, moral justifiability, and urgency) to determine the appropriate length of the list of basic needs for the practical project of global justice. Compared to other theories of global sufficientarianism, my account not only provides a more precise method to define the sufficiency threshold, but also proposes a morally significant threshold of sufficiency that can be endorsed by other sufficientarians such as Nussbaum.

面對全球貧窮問題，近年來有部份學者認為全球分配正義的目標應該是提升全球貧窮人口的生活水準到特定門檻（足夠主義），而不是消弭全球富人與窮人之間不平等的資源分配（平等主義），也不是優先改善生活水準較差的人們的生活（優先主義）。本文試圖建立與捍衛一個足夠主義的理論。本文首先透過分析國家體系的證成，論證足夠主義的門檻應是人類的基本需求。接著，本文提出三個更進一步決定基本需求數量的標準（經驗上必要、道德上可證成與緊急程度）。與其他的全球足夠主義理論相比，本文所建立的理論能提供更精準建立足夠主義門檻的方法，並且能建立道德上顯著的足夠主義門檻，為其他全球足夠主義理論者如紐斯邦所支持。