不完全訊息與戰爭爆發：一個隨機實驗

Incomplete Information and the Onset of War: A Randomized Experiment

10.6683/TPSR.202206_26(1).0002

郭銘傑(Jason M. Kuo)

國家間戰爭 ； 議價 ； 不完全訊息 ； 隨機實驗 ； 國際關係理論 ； Interstate War ； Bargaining ； Incomplete Information ； Randomized Experiment ； International-Relations Theory

台灣政治學刊

26卷1期（2022 / 06 / 01）

57 - 96

繁體中文;英文

戰爭議價理論是過去三十年西方主流國際關係學界解釋戰爭爆發的革命性突破之一。該研究途徑透過賽局模型的邏輯演繹得證下列本文關注的結論：不完全訊息是兩單一國家行為者談判破裂、兵戎相見，而使國際戰爭爆發的主要原因之一。這為以信心建立措施來促進和平的外交實務，提供學理上的重要微觀基礎。然而，國內外相關經驗文獻卻鮮少對訊息與戰爭的直接因果連結進行驗證。對此，本研究設計並執行第一個台灣本土的隨機實驗來驗證該理論的此一經驗意涵。透過隨機分派控制危機談判賽局模型中行為者及其對手特質以及雙方的權力對比，本研究發現：藉制度設計使行為者在國際談判過程中向對手揭露的權力對比訊息越不完全，行為者間衝突升高而爆發戰爭的頻率與機率分別也都越高。此實證研究發現與戰爭議價理論相互呼應。同時也對利用信心建立措施來維繫和平的政策建議提供更具內在效度的經驗證據。

The bargaining theory of war is a revolutionary breakthrough in theoretical explanations for war in the field of International Relations (IR). This bargaining approach applies game-theoretical deduction to arrive at one proposition that this article focuses on: wars as failed bargains between two rational unitary state actors arise from incomplete information. This provides an important micro-foundation for the use of confidence-building measures to promote peace in foreign policy practices. Yet, the related empirical literature has seldomly tested the direct causal link between information and war in experimental settings. To fill this gap, this study has designed and conducted the first randomized experiment in Taiwan to test the empirical implications of the theory. Through experimentally controlling the personal traits of actors and the distribution of power between them by random assignment, this study finds that war has occurred more frequently and has been more likely to occur between actors as more incomplete information about the distribution of power is revealed to actors in the process of interstate bargaining. These findings are in line with the bargaining theory of war; they also provide more internally valid empirical evidence in support of policy prescriptions for confidence-building measures.

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