The U.S.'s Deterrence and Assurance Strategies towards North Korea in the 1990s

10.6185/TJIA.V.202405_27(3).0001

Hey Lyung Yun；Man Fung Yeung

Post-Cold War ； The 1991 Basic Agreement ； The 1994 Geneva Framework ； Deterrence ； Assurance

Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

27卷3期（2024 / 05 / 01）

1 - 42

英文

In the early 1990s, tensions loomed large on the Korean Peninsula unlike the disintegration of the global confrontations and the movements to open the former Soviet socialist world brought about by the post-Cold War conflict structure. Despite the signing of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement in 1991, the North Korean nuclear issue that emerged drove the Korean Peninsula into a crisis, and its resolution through the US-DPRK Geneva Agreement also failed to produce ultimate results. This study explores the reasons behind the strategy of assurance pursued by Washington failed under such circumstances. In particular, this research examines the aspects of both assurance and deterrence of Washington's policy toward Pyongyang. Shedding new lights on assurance as an imperative part of successful deterrence, this study aims to provide policy implications for future policy toward North Korea.