代理結構與制度執行：以台灣土地使用分區制度執行為例

Agency Structure and Institutional Enforcement: The Enforcement of Zoning Institution in Taiwan

10.30409/JPA.200406_(11).0003

林森田(Sen-Tyan Lin)；洪維廷(Wei-Ting Hung)

制度執行 ； 土地使用分區制度 ； 不完全訊息 ； 共同代理 ； 裁量權 ； institution enforcement ； zoning institution ； incomplete information ； common agency ； discretionary power

公共行政學報

11期（2004 / 06 / 01）

77 - 107

繁體中文

制度在建立之後必須予執行，否則制度的建立就不具實質意義，而制度的執行往往涉及不同層級政府與選民間的多重代理關係，且必須耗費相當的資源與成本。既有土地使用分區制度之文獻，認為土地使用分區制度的執行，是地方選民與地方政府互動的單一代理執行關係之結果，而忽略了中央政府（或上級政府）的角色；亦有不分中央或地方政府，而以政府一語帶過者，似乎意謂著於土地使用分區制度之執行時，中央政府與地四府係同一決策主體或一致的目的，且不存在訊息不對稱的問題，此一觀點與實際的制度執行有出入，其分析所得的結果難免有偏差或分歧。因此本文基於代理理論，以共同代理之觀點，提供探討政府執行制度的一個分析架構，且應用此架構，分析土地使用分區制度之共同代理執行機制，並透過實證案例說明政治上的共同代理關係，如何影響地方政府對土地使用分區制度之執行，尤其是裁量權的行使對國土發展與地方自主間之關係，亦提供分析制度或政策執行的不同參考點。

After the creation of institution, it should be enforced; otherwise it is meaningless. The enforcement of institution is frequently related to the multiple agencies relationship between different levels of governments and constituency. Moreover, institutional enforcement is costly. Most of studies on the zoning institution regarded the enforcement of zoning institution as the consequences of one-principal-one agent relationship, i.e. the interaction between local constituents (landowners) and local governments, and ignored the role of central government. In addition, some papers didn’t distinguish the concept of central government from that of local government are the same. Besides, the problem of information asymmetry does not occur between central and local government. Theses viewpoints different from the real case of the enforcement of the institution will inevitably result in bias. Based on agency theory, this paper intends to analyze the impact of common agency structure upon the enforcement mechanisms of zoning institution, in particular to the exercise of discretionary power. A promising analytical framework will be provided for the investigation of enforcement of institution and policy.

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