台灣農會信用部經營管理的道德危險研究

Moral Hazard of Credit Department of Farmers Associations in Taiwan

10.30409/JPA.200512_(17).0003

廖坤榮(Kun-Jung Liao)

代理理論 ； 道德危險 ； 資訊不對稱 ； 隱藏性資訊 ； 機會主義 ； 競租 ； agency theory ； moral hazard ； information asymmetry ； hidden information ； opportunism ； rent-seeking

公共行政學報

17期（2005 / 12 / 01）

83 - 112

繁體中文

台灣農會是一多功能目標的組織，半世紀以來，農會與政府形成了一個獨特「夥伴關係」(partnership)，農會甚至代替政府執行許多農業政策，尤其信用部肩負著農業金融的角色，提供農業生產必要的資金。然而，近年來農會信用部「經營管理」出現了嚴重的「道德危機」問題。本文以「組織經濟學」(economics of organization)為基礎，試圖運用「代理人理論」中有關「資訊不對稱」(information asymmetry)、「隱藏性資訊」(hidden information)、「隱藏性行為」(hidden action)所引起之監督失靈，以及「機會主義」(opportunism)、「競租」(rent-seeking)理論建構(theoretical constructs)，探討農會信用部經營管理者的「道德危險」(moral hazard)問題。本文根據Williamson的交易成本經濟學「三層級圖」(three-level schema)，分析農會信用部經營管理者的道德危險行為與制度環境，及經營者個人理性自利行為的互動關係。其中「制度環境」因素即是農會法賦予農會的多功能目標、農會與政黨及政府關係等、農會所處地方政治生態等，這些制度環境因素影響基層金融監理效能，也成為長期以來政府未能落實基層金融監理的根本原因，並衍生成為信用部道德危險的制度誘因(institutional incentives)。

Farmers Associations of Taiwan (hereafter FAT) are multiple-function-goal groups composed on most of farmers in the island state. FAT, playing as policy agent has formed as unique partnership with the government since 1950s. Particularly, Credit Department of FAT has been responsible for provision of capital in agricultural production. Since 1995, illegal banking of local financing system has been increasing. This paper, based on Economics of Organization, employs both theoretical constructs of information asymmetry, hidden information, hidden action, generally argued by agency approach, to explain monitoring failure of organization. In addition, opportunism and rent-seeking discussed by economics of organization are used to account for moral hazard of Credit Department of FAT. Fundamentally, this paper employs Williamson's Three-Level Schema based on transaction cost economics examines moral hazard associated with institutional environment and with rent-seeking conducted by managers in FAT. Institutional environment argued by Williamson indicates FAT's policy missions and its relations with political parties, local politics. Personal rent-seeking indicates managers' opportunism, self-interest seeking with guile under FAT's political character, role of policy agent, and organizational governance. The former is institutional incentives, the latter as driving force of moral hazard behaviour in FAT.

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