地方建設BOT治理模式之績效研究：治理結構之觀點

Performance Studies on Governance of Local Infrastructure by BOT Modes: Viewpoints of Governance Structure

10.30409/JPA.201103_(38).0002

汪明生(Ming-Sheng Wang)；曾玉祥(Yu-Siang Zeng)

BOT模式治理 ； 交易成本 ； 治理結構 ； 績效 ； 資產專用性 ； BOT modes governance ； transaction cost ； governance structure ； performance ； asset specificity

公共行政學報

38期（2011 / 03 / 01）

49 - 73

繁體中文

本文以治理結構之概念，應用於地方建設BOT模式之治理，將BOT模式之治理分為準市場、準廠商之混合模型，然後以交易成本及資產專用性強度為基礎，研究其治理績效，據以瞭解BOT方案的達成度，驗證推動BOT方案適合以何種模式經營。 本文之研究設計，以18種地方建設方案為標的，假設可行性、需要性、融資易、低風險、報酬、廠商意願六項準則為績效指標，其中融資易（不確定性低）、低風險（資產專用性低）二項準則為低交易成本指標。研究方法以德菲法徵詢學者專家意見，尋求一致性後，以集群分析及階層迴歸驗證結果。 結果顯示推動BOT之地方建設方案，醫院、停車場、靈骨塔、渡假旅館、遊樂區、勞工住宅、焚化爐等有較高績效，U檢定顯示其相對效率有顯著差異，階層迴歸顯示交易成本有高解釋力，上開方案傾向準市場模型特性，資產專用性低導致交易成本較低。 由區組集群分析驗證，交易成本低之區組與績效高之區組，二者觀察體的集群分類相同，並有高解釋力，顯示交易成本低為方案取得高績效之原因。 由驗證之結論，BOT模式治理之經營，資產專用性低的方案適合準市場模式經營，資產專用性高的方案適合準廠商模式經營，支持治理結構之理論假說。

This article takes the viewpoints of governance structure to apply to governance of local infrastructure by BOT modes which is divided into the mixed models of quasi-market or quasi-firms. Next, transaction cost and the strength of asset specificity are the bases to study the governance performance to understand the achievements of BOT program and prove which model is adequate to operate and promote BOT projects. This study design focuses on 18 local infrastructure projects to assume 6 criteria of practicability, desirability, easily financing, low risk, remuneration, and manufactures' intentions as the performance index, two criteria of easily financing (low uncertainty) and low risks (low asset specificity) as the low transaction costs index. The research method is to ask experts and scholars for opinions by Delphi method and look for consistency, cluster analysis and hierarchical regression are used to verify the results. The findings show that the local infrastructure promoted by BOT such as hospitals, parking lots, Columbarium Pagodas, Resort hotels, Amusement parks, labor housing and Incinerators, etc. have higher performances. U test shows that it has significant differences in relative efficiency. The hierarchical regression shows that transaction cost has high explanatory power. The abovementioned projects are inclined to the property of quasi-market model, and manifest lower asset specificity causes lower transaction cost. The sections of low transaction cost and high performance are verified by cluster analysis. The cluster classification of two observing objects is the same and has high explanatory power which shows low transaction is the reason for the program to achieve high performances. The conclusion of the operation governed by BOT modes is that the projects of low asset specificity is suitable for quasi-market model and the projects of high asset specificity is suitable for the mixed model of quasi-firms which stands for the theoretical proposition of governance structure.

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