公地、逆式工地、和兩者之間

10.6509/TLM.201212_63(12).0004

熊秉元

公地 ； 逆式公地 ； 共有資源 ； 兢租 ； 財產權 ； Commons ； anti-commons ； common pool resources ； rent seeking ； property rights

法令月刊

63卷12期（2012 / 12 / 01）

63 - 80

繁體中文

關於逆式公地的概念，還有許多混淆不清的地方。原因之一，是Heller（1998）對於性質不同的問題，都以逆式公地這個概念來涵蓋。具體而言，莫斯科店鋪大門深鎖和印第安保留地多人持有，雖然都隱合資源未盡其用：然而，店鋪不得開張，是管制體系的問題，是資源（店鋪營運的權利）還沒有得到司法體系的認可和支持。印第安保留地不能有效利用，則是因為共同持有人太多；財產權界定的本身，則是清楚明確。本文的第一個目標，是希望釐清逆式公地的意義。其次，在探討逆式公地的文獻裡，Buchanan & Yoon（2000）具有里程碑的地位。然而，文中所提出的模型，主要是觀念上的論對，在現實社會裡不容易想像。本文將說明，分析公地和逆式公地的模型，如果利用Buchanan & Tullock（1962）這本經典著作裡的架構，將更為其實、更有說服力。最後，大千世界裡，公地和逆式公地其實是少數特例，而不是常態。在真實世界裡，即使是在莫斯科，還是有許多店鋪照常營業。本文將論誰，掙脫逆式公地束縛的方式之一，是利益均霑；讓眾多管制者都有甜頭，人人有好處，一路過關斬將。在公地和逆式公地之間，這是一種介於兩者之間（theIn-betweens）的現象。本文將利用其實的數據資料，描繪「兩者之間」的樣貌（configurations）。透過探討「兩者之間」的現象，不但有助於釐清逆式公地的性質，而且有利於探討相關的政策涵義。

The idea of anti-commons (re)-introduced by Heller (1998) has initiated numerous subsequent studies and the concept has been used to cover scenarios of different nature. However, the closed front stores in Moscow are better interpreted as the result of rent seeking, with each and every approval granting bureaucrat seeking favors and thus depleting the pool of potential resources (potential bribes). This is actually a case of commons, as opposed to the case of Indian reservations where a large number of owners make it difficult to collectively utilize resources efficiently. The first goal of the present study is thus to clarify the concept of anti-commons. Secondly, we provide a critique of the model of Buchanan and Yoon (2000) and argue that the earlier model of Buchanan and Tullock (1962) better illustrates both the commons (employing the any-person rule in resource allocation decisions) and anti-commons (using the unanimity rule.) Finally, an in-between case is identified where the barriers posed by the chain of regulatory agencies are overcome by following the latent rule of ＂An overflying anser leaves behind some of its feather.＂ Empirical evidence is presented to support the claim.

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