農地違規使用管理簽約外包之研究

The Contracting Out of Managing the Illegal Use of Farmland

10.6677/JTLR.200905_12(1).0001

林森田(Sen-Tyan Lin)；洪維廷(Wei-Ting Hung)

農地違規使用管理 ； 簽約外包 ； 代理理論 ； 不完全契約 ； Managing the Illegal Use of Farmland ； Contracting Out ； Agency Theory ； Incomplete Contract

臺灣土地研究

12卷1期（2009 / 05 / 01）

1 - 29

繁體中文

長期以來，農地違規使用嚴重破壞農業生產環境，一直是政府困擾的問題；最近民間檢舉農地違規使用的件數大幅超過政府查報案件之情形，亦有建議將現行階層式的農地違規使用管理制度，改變為混合式之簽約外包管理模式，故本文基於代理理論，並透過不完全契約的觀點，分析兩種不同程度簽約外包模式執行時的代理關係，且進一步探討政府選擇簽約外包必需考量的因素與限制條件，再對縣（市）政府農業主管機關相關承辦人員問卷調查與深度訪談的結果，分析農地違規使用管理簽約外包的相關課題，提供政府農地使用管理的思考方向。研究結果發現，於採取兩種不同程度的簽約外包時，可於某程度上減輕現行執行模式之民代關說壓力，提高查處績效。但政府於簽約外包時，除考量「投入成本導向與執行效益」之因素外，若採取將查報、取締與處理工作全部簽約外包之模式2，則將涉及「主權任務」只能由政府執行之爭議，且「決策權」屬於民間業者，將導致難以兼顧社會利益之困境等限制，本文不建議採用。若僅採取查報工作簽約外包之模式1，後續取締與處理仍由政府執行之方式，則可避免前述之限制，且「訊息不完全」及「資產專用性」問題所帶來的社會成本，於程度上也相對地減輕許多，政府可考慮採用。有關查報工作簽約外包「訊息不完全」所產生的道德危機問題，則可透過契約的內容加以約定，使業者揭露其執行訊息，以利監督。再者，政府可將業者查報結果予以公開化，除可提供土地所有權人有提出異議的機會，緩和政治壓力與民代關說之負面影響，並可減輕後續取締與處理的困難度。

The illegal use of farmland severely causes the problems for the environment of agricultural production which is a long term troublesome problem for the government. Recently, the number of report of illegal farmland use by civilians exceeds the number of government prosecution. In addition, there is a suggestion to contract out the monitoring of illegal use of farmland. This paper analyses two different models of contracting and investigates their determinants and limitations based on agency theory and theory of incomplete contract. Data were collected using postal questionnaires and depth interviews with responsible local officials to compare the current monitoring system with the proposed contracting scheme. The result shows that the adoption of a contracting system may lower the political pressure for better management of farmland. However, in addition to the orientation of input costs and benefits of better performance, the government should also consider the limitations of sovereign power and decision making transferred to private firm in monitoring and enforcement by the model of total contracting. Thus total contracting is not suggested. However, these limitations can be avoided by adopting contracting of monitoring work only and the subsequent work is enforced by government. The problems of incomplete information and asset specificity could be mediated. This paper argues that the government can consider contracting out the monitoring work. Regarding to the incomplete information which may causes the problem of moral hazard that can be dealt by the contents of contract so that the firm must reveal its monitoring information for the better policing of government. Moreover, government should publish the illegal use of farmland monitored by contract out. This could provide opportunity for the owners to appeal and to mitigate the adverse effect from political pressure so as to have a better management for the subsequent punishment and trace.

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