政府獎補助私立大專院校機制之公平性研究

The Fairness Regarding the Mechanism of Government Grants to Private Universities and Colleges

10.3966/160683002013090087008

胡維新(Wei-Hsin Hu)；賴永裕(Yung-Yu Lai)

私立大專院校 ； 代理理論 ； 辦學績效 ； 募款補助 ； private universities and colleges ； agent theory ； school performance ； private donation and government grants

學校行政

87期（2013 / 09 / 01）

156 - 172

繁體中文

本文旨在評估政府獎補助私立大專院校機制之公平性。政府依私立學校法獎補助辦學績效良好學校，若辦學績效指標不能有效反應學校努力成果，教育部最終所給予的獎補助經費將可能存在偏差。從代理理論得知所有權人與代理人之間存有資訊不對稱問題，政府為給予獎補助經費之所有權人，學校為執行政府獎補助經費之代理人。學校依賴辦學績效指標爭取政府獎補助經費，以獲得來自於政府的獎補助收入，另一方面政府依賴著來自學校所釋放的辦學績效訊息，公平且有效率地分配教育經費資源。倘若政府所設計的機制能有效觀察到各學校辦學績效，在沒有其他干擾情況之下，隨時間經過，政府所給予的獎補助將會調整而趨近於學校真實之表現。以2004至2008學年度私立大專院校資料進行實證，結果證實當學校辦學績效呈現相對穩定時，來自於政府獎補助收入變動的幅度將隨著時間經過而越來越趨近於零。亦即當學校辦學績效固定於某一水準時，政府給予私立大專院校獎補助款的變動幅度將趨於收斂。其政策意涵為現今教育部獎補助私立大專院校辦法能有效衡量私立大專院校經營表現，反應學校經營成果，並公平有效率地分配教育經費資源。

This objective of this paper is to evaluate the fairness regarding the mechanism of government grants to private universities and colleges. The government gives financial support to private universities and colleges with good performance according to Private School Law. The ultimate grants by Ministry of Education may be bias when school performance indicators cannot reflect substance of the effort made by schools. The principal-agent problem arises under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when the principal hires an agent. The government is the owner of grants whereas school is the agent to deal with government financial supports. Schools receive government grants based on performance measures. On the other hand, the government allocates the resource of educational expense fairly and efficiently according to signals released. Adjusted over time, government grants will reflect the substance of school performance when the mechanism regarding government grants effectively captures performance measures under the circumstances of no interference. The analyses are based on data collected from 2004 to 2008. The empirical results show that over time, the magnitude of change regarding government grants will be approach to zero when the school's performance is relatively stable. That is when the school's performance fixed on a certain level, the magnitude of change regarding government grants will tend to converge. It indicates that Regulations for Subsidy and Award Regarding Private Universities and Colleges can evaluate the school's performance effectively, capture performance measures, and allocate the resource of educational expense fairly and efficiently.

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