資訊不對稱下雙占議程控制的探討

The Discussion of Duopoly Agenda Control under Asymmetric Information

10.29963/TOJEB.200506.0001

王智賢(Jue-Shyan Wang)

資訊不對稱 ； 議事主席 ； 雙占 ； asymmetric information ； agenda setter ； duopoly

真理財經學報

12期（2005 / 06 / 01）

1 - 22

繁體中文

本篇論文係討論資訊不對稱下雙占議程控制（兩派利益相反的議事主席）對政治議案表決結果的影響。在作法上，我們係延伸Banks(1990)在訊息不對稱下討論單一獨攬議事主席的提案表決模型。我們得到單期提案裡，一般情形下會得到對中位數選民極佳的結果；而在重複提案制度下，有時利害衝突的兩派主席將會有對中位數選民較差的提案勾結解。

This paper analyzes the effect of duopoly agenda control on the vote for political proposal when the agenda setters who are in two contrary interests parties are under asymmetric information. We extend voter model with monopoly on the single agenda setter which under the situation of symmetric information developed by Banks(1990), The conclusion is it will be best to median voter in one-period proposal. In repeated proposal, however, the agenda setters with two contrary interests parties will propose the collusion solution to the median voter.

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