論公司治理、審計與企業管理型態對投資之影響

The Effects of Corporate Governance, Auditing and Management Types on Investment

10.29963/TOJEB.201012.0003

王茂昌(Mao-Chang Wang)

公司治理 ； 審計 ； 管理型態 ； 投資 ； 資訊不對稱 ； Corporate Governance ； Auditing ； Management Type ； Investment ； Asymmetric Information

真理財經學報

23期（2010 / 12 / 01）

51 - 72

繁體中文

本文係分析公司為因應市場成長的商機需進行投資時，不同管理型態的公司在強調公司治理的環境下，探討審計功能對投資之影響，以瞭解企業家或經理人與會計師的策略選擇。本文運用賽局模型來探討公司治理、審計、企業管理型態及投資之相關議題，並運用賽局理論之反向歸納法推導其均衡條件及結果。研究結果指出，企業採經理人經營時，會計師較易維持獨立性;企業家保留股權比率大於期初持股比率，且較高的會計師審計公費，為企業家選擇對投資人不利的投資專案之訊號;而強調公司治理及審計功能，能降低投資人與企業家或經理人之間的資訊不對稱，有助於解決投資不足的問題。

This paper studies the auditing function that affect the investment in different management types firms under the emphasizing corporate governance environment, and to understand the strategy choice of the enterpriser or the manager, and the auditor, while the firm must operate the investment project for the expanding markets. This paper is derived the equilibrium analysis by game theory, and discusses the issue of corporate governance, auditing, management types and investment.This paper has policy implications. When the firm is operated by the manager, it can impel the auditor to maintain independence. The enterpriser retained rate is more than the stockholding rate, and the auditor's auditing fee is highly, they are the signal that the enterpriser chooses the unfavorable investment project for investors. The more the effects of corporate governance and auditing are, the more the asymmetric information problem between the investor and the enterpriser or the manager is solved, and it can solve the underinvestment problem.

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