經理人與董監事之持股對公司績效的影響－以台灣電子產業為例

The Impacts of Shareholding by Managers, Supervisors and Directors on Corporate Performance-The Case of Electronic Industry in Taiwan

尹賢瑜(Hsien-Yu Yin)；童心達(Shin-Ta Tung)；陳沛雨(Shu-Fen Shen)

代理問題 ； 股權結構 ； 公司績效 ； Agency problem ； ownership structure ； corporate performance

真理財經學報

26期（2014 / 06 / 01）

23 - 52

繁體中文

在所有權及經營權分離的公司組織中，代理問題一直是企業裡經常被探討問題，經理人與董監事持股率的多寡皆會對公司績效產生影響，因此產生了兩種不同理論假說：利益收斂假說以及鞏固性假說，此兩種假說皆在研究文獻上引發多名學者的探討及企業的關注，而本研究也將延續此研究架構，探討經理人與董監事之持股率對於公司績效是否有影響。本研究以複迴歸模型進行實證分析，但經理人持股率對公司績效並無顯著影響。根據許多文獻如Harris and Raviv(1990)，都曾提出透過負債比率，經理人、董監事的持股對公司經營績效產生影響的說法，因此本文在模式中加入經理人與董監事的持股變數與負債比率的交互作用，具顯著性的變數個數與判定係數都獲得增加，並顯示出研究結果會因高中低持股群而產生差異。而本研究的實證結果如下：1. 經理人持股率對於公司績效變數的影響只有在低持股群與負債比率交互作用時有顯著性負向影響，符合鞏固性假說。2. 董監事持股率對公司績效變數的影響只有在高持股群時具有顯著負向影響。3. 在高董監事持股群中，董監事持股與負債比率作交互作用後，對於公司績效呈現正向影響。經理人持股越高，亦有相同的結果，符合利益收斂假說。4. 在高董監事持股群中，當董監事或經理人持股率增加時，對負債比率與公司績效的關係具顯著性的負向影響，董監事與經理人持股對代理問題的貢獻程度具有互斥效果。

With the separation of ownership and management to the enterprises, there comes agency problem. The shareholding ratios of managers, supervisors and directors will affect corporate performance. For explaining the situations, there are two theoretical hypotheses proposed: convergence of interest hypothesis and entrenchment hypothesis. The hypotheses get much academic and practical attention. This research will also follow the same framework to study the impact from the interaction between the shareholding ratios of managers, supervisors and directors on corporate performance. We proceed to empirical analysis by multiple regression models. No significance are found from shareholding ratios of managers, supervisors and directors on corporate performance. Some references, such as Harris and Raviv(1990), have viewpoints that shareholding ratios of managers, supervisors and directors will influence corporate performance especially through debt ratio. So we add the interaction variables between the shareholding ratio and debt ratio in regression models. Not only are the number of significant variables and coefficient of determination increased, but also are the research results depending on different shareholding groups found. The empirical results of this research are as follows: 1. Only in low shareholding ratios of managers group there is an interaction between the shareholding ratio and debt ratio, shareholding ratios of managers have a significant negative impact on corporate performance. The result is accordance with entrenchment hypothesis. 2. Only in high shareholding ratios of supervisors and directors group, shareholding ratios of supervisors and directors have a significant negative impact on corporate performance. 3. In high shareholding ratios of supervisors and directors group there is an interaction between the shareholding ratio and debt ratio, shareholding ratios have a significant positive impact on corporate performance. Rather than supervisors and directors, shareholding ratios of managers will obtain the same result. The concluding is accordance with convergence of interest hypothesis. 4. In high shareholding ratios of supervisors and directors group, higher shareholding ratios of directors or managers increase will have a significant negative impact on relationship between debt ratio and corporate performance.

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1. 莊美玲(2017)。董監事特性、股權結構和公司營運績效的關係。長榮大學經營管理研究所學位論文。2017。1-54。
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3. 李幸曄(2017)。董事會結構與經理人薪酬對公司負債程度之關聯性 -以超額現金之角度。長榮大學經營管理研究所學位論文。2017。1-43。