题名

金融科技、房屋價格、與銀行審核誘因

并列篇名

Fintech, House Prices, and Bank Screening Incentives

作者

曾秉倫(Ping-Lun Tseng)；郭文忠(Wen-Chung Guo)

关键词

金融科技房貸平台 ； 銀行 ； 抵押房貸 ； 房屋價格 ； 銀行審核誘因 ； Fintech lending ； banks ； mortgages ； house prices ； screening incentives

期刊名称

住宅學報

卷期/出版年月

30卷2期（2021 / 12 / 01）

页次

67 - 96

内容语文

繁體中文
中文摘要

本研究建立一理論模型探討金融科技房貸平台（Fintech mortgage lender）、房屋價格、與銀行事前審核誘因之間的關係。研究結果顯示金融科技房貸平台的發展將提高抵押房貸供給與房屋需求，導致房價上漲及抵押品價值提高，降低銀行區分優劣房貸案的預期報酬與事前審核誘因。當資訊科技提升金融科技房貸平台的事前審核技術時，房價下跌並提高銀行事前審核誘因；當資訊科技提高金融科技房貸平台可募集資金時，房價上漲且降低銀行事前審核誘因。提高資本適足率或緊縮貨幣政策將降低銀行可貸放資金總量與房屋需求，房價隨之下跌，促進銀行事前審核誘因。
英文摘要

We establish a theoretical model to explore the relationship among Fintech lending, house prices, and bank screening incentives. Our analysis considering the association between mortgage and house markets reveals that the rise of Fintech mortgage lenders increases the supply of mortgages and the demand for houses, thus pushing up the house prices. Since houses are collaterals of mortgages, an increase of the house prices implies the higher value of collaterals, lowering the return difference between good and bad mortgage applicants and thus reducing bank screening incentives. Moreover, when the advance of information technology improves the screening technology of the Fintech lenders, the house prices go down, decreasing the value of collaterals and thus increasing bank screening incentives. On the other hand, when the advance of information technology increases the capital raised by the Fintech lenders, the house prices go up, decreasing bank screening incentives. Raising capital requirements or tightening monetary policy will decrease the banks’ loanable funds and thus reduce the demand for houses, pushing down the house prices and then increasing bank screening incentives.
主题分类 社會科學 > 社會學
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被引用次数
  1. (2024)。自住與非自住之房屋稅率差異對房價之影響－差異中之差異法的應用。住宅學報，33(2)，27-62。
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