公投評估、罅隙認定及控管

Referendum Evaluation, Gap Identification and Gap Control

10.7070/PR.200406.0001

林水波(Shoei-Po Lin)

公民投票 ； 公投評估 ； 罅隙認定 ； 罅隙控管 ； 制度拾荒 ； 政黨主權 ； Referendum ； Referendum Evaluation ； Gap Identification ； Gap Control ； Institutional Scavenging ； Party Sovereignty

政策研究學報

5期（2004 / 06 / 01）

1 - 28

繁體中文

由於公投立法是在2004年總結大選的攻防戰下完成的，以致其中較為重大的規定，並非透由兩大政團理性對話而建立共識，而是透過國會多數的方式而成，導致距離公投的標竿制度，猶有一段差距，亟待識者藉由評估的標凖，由其制度結構安排進行整全性的評估，找出該制度所存在的問題。 本文首先由議題顯著、選舉算計、價值左右、見解平行、掮客牽線、孵化短暫、國會主控、制度拾荒及再思拒絕等九個面向述明公投立法的特色，間接顯示公投之所以存罅隙的根源。 公投制度一旦合法化，就逐步進入制度深化的過程，而精緻發展的前提在於，妥適選定評估標凖，進行整全性的評估，以利制度存在問題的認定。本文第二個焦點議題就設定十二可的評估，從中建構制度本身所蘊存的問題所在。 歷經制度的評估，吾人發現現行制度存有八大制度罅隙：轄區範圍重疊、多數宰制不宜、僵局難解不安、行使困難不當、超前立法不時、正常主權不義、排除諮商不平、制度虛擬不免，有待績階性的控管，將其進行對症下藥的轉型。 而在填滿公投罅隙時，相關職司要強化制度學習、調適主導價值、營造言談情境及檢試制度結構才能建構制度轉型的理想情境，鋪排出合乎標竿的制度因子選擇。 本文在結論上提出政治流勢引導制度、恐懼心理影響安排、現行結構不勝評估、制度標竿猶待奮進、視框重構有利變遷及系統思維佈署綱絡等六大制度設計的啟示。

Three main issues are addressed in this paper. The characteristics of referendum in Taiwan are deeply clarified and interpreted. This clarification and interpretation have shown eight indicators: issue salience, electoral calculation, value domination, frame differentiation, broker linkage, short-term incubation, congress domination, institutional scavenging and reconsideration denial. Once referendum is legalized, it is involved in the process of institutional evolution. The precondition of elaborate evolution is predicated on evaluation. Hence, the second focus of this paper is to use twelve criteria to evaluate legalized referendum. By doing so, we can easily identify problems caused by the short-term institutional incubation and decided by only one dominant party group in the congress. There are eight institutional gaps as contrasts by the systems of advanced countries after we evaluate the existing system of referendum in Taiwan. They are: overlapping jurisdiction, domination by majority, stalemate stagnation, enforcement infeasibility, legalization ahead of the times, party sovereignty, consultation elimination and institutional symbolization. These gaps need to be bridged by next steps to carefully revise the structures of institutional arrangement and choice. The process to bridge institutional gaps should pay attention to institutional learning, transformation of party’s dominant values, building speech situation and examination of institutional structure. In conclusion, the paper provides six enlightenments of institutional design: political stream enforcing institutional formation, psychological phobia influencing institutional arrangements, existing structure including serious shortcomings, benchmarking learning being promoted, frame reformulation facilitating to institutional change and systems thinking guiding network development.

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