题名

台北市政府促進民間參與公共建設政策之研究

并列篇名

The Research on the Policy of Taipei City Government's Private Participation in Public Infrastructure

DOI

10.7070/PR.200806.0023

作者

吳秀光(Samuel Shiouh-guang Wu);吳宗憲(Chuang-Hsien Wu)

关键词

促進民間參與公共建設法 ; 台北市促進民間參與公共建設政策 ; 公共選擇理論 ; 代理人理論 ; 跨域管理 ; Act for Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects ; Institution of Taipei City Government's Private Participation in Public Infrastructure ; Public Choice Theory ; Agent Theory ; Boundary-

期刊名称

政策研究學報

卷期/出版年月

8期(2008 / 06 / 01)

页次

23 - 75

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

面對不同執政黨的中央政府及較高素質的公民,台北市政府所面對的預算不足及民眾需求高漲的雙重困境,較國內其他各級政府更鉅,故除了引進內部績效管理制度變革外,更具策略性的改革方向,則是著重不同機制問功能的重新調整,將傳統上屬於公部門的服務,透過外包及競標,轉由公司或非營利組織來提供,此即本研究探討市府「促進民間參與公共建設」政策的原因。 本研究發現市府卅餘年的促參政策有政策創新、官僚慣性、集中特定模式、結合企業與非營利組織等特色,另外,透過公共選擇理論的分析,市府未來在實施「促進民間參與公共建設法」時,可能遭遇議會衝突、形式化評估、代理人問題、監督不足等問題。

英文摘要

Because Taipei city government gets fewer and fewer budget and faces higher and higher citizen's demand at the same time, it had changed internal performance system. Moreover, Taipei city government is focusing more on transacting function between government and private organization (including firms and non-profit organization). That's why our article here will discuss the policy of Taipei city government's private participation in public infrastructure. In this article, we find Taipei city government has developed many strategies in dealing with private participation policy, such as policy innovation, bureaucratic inertia, focusing on some specific models, and combining profit and non-profit organization. Furthermore, by public choice theory lens, we forecast Taipei city government might encounter city councilor's confliction, apparent evaluation, Agent problem and locking supervision.

主题分类 社會科學 > 社會科學綜合
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被引用次数
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  2. 柯于璋(2013)。政府委託研究案代理問題之探討:一個結合賽局理論與代理人理論的研究取向。行政暨政策學報,57,1-35。
  3. 謝博明、高秉毅(2018)。社會住宅物業經營管理型態與策略之初探性研究-以臺北市為例。物業管理學報,9(1),71-87。
  4. 詹立煒(2019)。公私合夥的衝突與管理-促參法制度性爭議案例解析。中國行政評論,25(3),24-51。