题名 |
“依賴”是人類社會無可避免的現實與挑戰:Eva F. Kittay對依賴與照顧的論點 |
并列篇名 |
'Dependency' is the Responsibility No Human Society Can Escape: Eva F. Kittay's Argument on Dependency and Caregiving |
DOI |
10.6265/TJSW.2008.6(2)5 |
作者 |
洪惠芬(Hui-Fen Hung) |
关键词 |
依賴 ; 照顧 ; 關懷倫理 ; 身心障礙 ; Dependency ; Caregiving ; Ethic of Care ; and Disability |
期刊名称 |
臺灣社會福利學刊 |
卷期/出版年月 |
6卷2期(2008 / 02 / 01) |
页次 |
147 - 190 |
内容语文 |
繁體中文 |
中文摘要 |
本文以「依賴與照顧」作爲主軸,對女性主義哲學家Eva F. Kittay在不同發表中的相關論點勾勒出一個「整體性樣貌」。由於Kittay對依賴與照顧議題的論點相當程度受到「關懷倫理」的影響,因此本文首先對「關懷倫理」這支女性主義流派作簡單的介紹,接著再說明這個觀點在Kittay理論當中的位置、以及它對Kittay所構成的挑戰。其次,本文也嘗試整理出Kittay關於依賴與照顧議題的「整體」立論邏輯,並將它區分作三個主題,依序進行討論。第一個主題是依賴是無可避免的事實。第二個主題是照顧者「衍生的依賴」處境。最後則是Kittay對照顧的制度安排初步提出的構想。儘管Kittay從未清楚地說明她對照顧制度安排的構想落實在具體制度的樣貌,然而我們仍舊可以根據她對相關法案與政策的批判推敲出:她的答案是一種「福利國家」式的解方。這個解方意味著:人們將間接地透過納稅承擔起他們對依賴者與照顧者應盡的道德責任。對許多人來說,這樣的代價並不輕鬆。我們認爲:Kittay指出的福利國家式解方雖然不難理解,但它絕對不是輕鬆的答案。 |
英文摘要 |
'Inevitable dependency' is one of the most important concepts in Kittay's writings. Several of the theses in her writings have based on that concept explicitly or otherwise. Her thesis of dependency and care-giving is obviously one such example. In my view, the thesis could be seen as a legacy of the feminist thought, 'the ethic of care'. In 1982, Carol Gilligan published In A Different Voice in which she first proposed the concept of the ethic of care. Her purpose was to develop it as a challenge to the status of 'the ethic of justice' as the only valid moral approach. Gilligan suggested that the ethic of care constituted an alternative moral approach to the ethic of justice. This thesis in no time evoked hot controversies within feminism. Some questioned technically the validity of the method Gilligan used to justify such a thesis. Others doubted more profoundly the adequacy of the concept itself as morality. They pointed out that under the moral approach of care ethic, one defines one's moral responsibilities for others on the basis of her relation with others and her responsiveness to their needs, and that such may induce persons easily trapped into self sacrifice for satisfying others' needs. According to the ethic of justice, the boundaries of one's responsibility for others are grounded on the principle of 'objective fairness'. It means that when I make moral claims to others, or conversely, when others make moral claims to me, no one should disregard the principle of objective fairness. That is to say, each moral actor ought to be responsible for his own desires and choices. By contrast, according to the ethic of care, the boundaries of one's responsibility for others are not limited by the principle of objective fairness. For the moral actors of the ethic of care, the definition of responsibilities for others depends on others' perception of 'subjective hurts'. That is, if my action or inaction will cause someone to perceive being hurt, I must assume the responsibility to protect him from being hurt by my action or inaction. The perception of being hurt is subjective and is connected with interpersonal role expectations. Hence, when moral actors commit themselves to conform to interpersonal role expectations, they will easily over-assume the responsibilities for other people's well-being, impeding themselves from searching for their personal planning for life. As interpersonal role expectations are deeply embedded in the existing social norms, in a society of gender inequality, the role expectations for female social actors will be inconsistent with the principle of gender equality. In other words, if under the ethic of care moral actors have to try their best to act in accordance with other people's role expectation of themselves, without questioning legitimacy of the role expectations, what some feminists have worried about the ethic of care is plausible: the ethic of care cannot avoid the possibility of strengthening the constraint of the traditional gender norms on woman, preventing them from leading an autonomous life. In a word, the possible limitation of Gilligan's concept of the ethic of care as a moral theory is that: moral actors may assume too many responsibilities for others, giving up their own interest and personal life planning. Hence, anyone who relies on Gilligan's concept of care ethic to develop his theory or to solve a problem in his theory will have to face that possible limitation. Kittay's case is no exception. How does Kittay deal with such possible limitation? In sum, the concept of care ethic plays just an instrumental role in Kittay's theory: she takes it only to justify the human society's moral responsibility for the dependent and the caregiver. But she has not attempted to handle the problem comprehensively. This doesn't mean that she can do without addressing the theoretical problem that the autonomy of moral actors under the ethic of care may be severely constricted by others' unreasonable expectations of them. And indeed she has never escaped this theoretical problem. In some way, this problem occupies a central position in her theory. But, her concerns and attentions to such a problem are confined to the part related to the issues of dependency and caregiving. That is, when she as a moral actor takes up the responsibility to respond to the dependent's needs for care service, the caregiver's own wellbeing and personal life planning may also be constrained severely. Kittay's analysis and solutions for the possible constraint on the caregiver's autonomy are closely connected with 'care as a social institution' in contemporary society: 1). First, at certain time in one's life, all of us would become a dependent whose life must rely on some caregiver's service to carry on. The dependency that results from the limitation of self-care ability is called 'inevitable dependency'. 2). Secondly, the services a caregiver provides to the dependent, whether paid or unpaid, should be treated as a moral responsibility. To some extent, Kittay takes the principle of 'subjective hurt' of the ethic of care to justify a caregiver's moral responsibility for the dependent. Without enough self-care ability, a dependent needs to rely on someone's care service to maintain his life. So, according to the principle of subjective hurt, once a person takes the position of caregiver, for whatever reasons, he has the moral responsibility to make sure that his dependent gets the care services she needs. 3). The difficulties faced by a caregiver, when responding to a dependent's needs, can lead her to repress her own needs and desires, and give up her personal life planning, even to quit her job and thus lose the labor market income. Such are the essence of the role of caregiver. Therefore, anybody who assumes the role of a caregiver, no matter whether she is gender conscious, and whether her dependent gets aware of and respects her own needs and interest, may likely become trapped into the difficulties when self needs are repressed and autonomy is threatened. Kittay interprets the difficulties as the 'situation of dependency' and calls it 'derived dependency'. Such dependency is derived because such difficulties arise from the situation the caregiver is in such that she must depend a third person to respond to her deferred needs and solve the problem of income loss resulting from quitting the job. 4). Derived dependency is also inevitable. There must be persons depending on others' care service to maintain their life. Therefore, it means that some members must assume the responsibility to respond to those persons' needs for care service. And, any person taking the role of a 'caregiver' inevitably gets situated into derived dependency, relying on the third person to meet her needs and solve her financial difficulties. 5). Kittay doesn't treat caregiver's derived dependency as a negative concept. Both the dependent's dependency on the caregiver and the caregiver's derived dependency on a third person are neutral concepts. They are used to describe the situations of the dependent and the caregiver. In other words, though the caregiver’s derived dependency is inevitable, it's not irresolvable. Whether the caregiver situated in derived dependency is better or worse rests on whether there is the third person committing himself to respond to caregiver's deferred needs and financial problems. The third person's responsiveness to caregiver's derived dependency is also seen as a moral responsibility in Kittay's theory. 6). Although the caregiver's responsiveness to the dependent's needs for care service and the third person's responsiveness to the caregiver's derived dependency are both treated as a moral responsibility, Kittay doesn't think that both kinds of moral responsibility should be assumed solely by the one caregiver and the one third person of the individual family. For her, both kinds of moral responsibility should be collectively shared by all social members. Kittay's theory focuses on the care activities as a social institution. She uses the principle of subjective hurt of the ethic of care to justify the caregiver's moral responsibility for the dependent, but unlike Gilligan, Kittay doesn't view caregiver's self sacrifice for assuming such moral responsibility purely as the immaturity of her moral development. Also, she doesn't follow feminist approach to attribute caregiver's self sacrifice to the prevailing role expectations and norms of patriarchy. What Gilligan and other feminists have worried about may be plausible. But for Kittay, they are not the issue of her concern. What has concerned her is how a society arranges the care activities institutionally. If the institutional arrangement for the care activities is unjust, even though the caregiver's moral development grows mature, and her dependent becomes considerate, she remains easily trapped into the hardship where her basic needs and well being are severely exploited. The solution rests on the institutional arrangement for care services. Kittay argues that the dependent's needs for care service and caregiver's derived dependency are not the moral responsibilities only for their individual families. Rather, they are responsibilities for the society as a whole to bear, and all members of the society must not avoid. However, she hasn't articulated how the ideal should be embodied. But if we may go by her critique of the relevant legislations and policies, it is clear that what she thinks of as the just institutional arrangement for care service must be the 'welfare-state- styled' solution: the state is expected to establish a public system of care service and provide related transfer payments to share the financial and labor burden of individual families. To do that, people have to pay heavier tax and give up more right to the utilization of their own income. That would not be easy to implement. Thus though Kittay's 'welfare-state-styled' solution seems understandable, it is never an easy answer. |
主题分类 |
社會科學 >
社會學 |
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