题名

Export Subsidy under Strategic Delegation

并列篇名

策略授權下之最適出口補貼

DOI

10.30087/APEMR.200609.0006

作者

王鳳生；林育珊

关键词

市場份額授權 ； 銷售額授權 ； 出口補貼 ； Market Share Delegation ； Sales Delegation ； Export Subsidy

期刊名称

亞太經濟管理評論

卷期/出版年月

10卷1期（2006 / 09 / 01）

页次

95 - 102

内容语文

英文
中文摘要

本文在Brander-Spencer之兩國第三地市場競爭模型下，探討市場份額之管理授權如何影響最適出口補貼之決定，並與銷售額授權和Cournot數量競爭做比較。証明結果發現，市場份額授權下之最適出口補貼值落於銷售額授權和Cournot數量競爭之間，市場份額授權下之兩國福利會優於銷售額授權之情況，兩出口廠商在加入管理授權下之後雖仍會陷入囚犯兩難境界，不過市場份額相較於銷售額授權較不嚴重。
英文摘要

This paper demonstrates that in Brander-Spencer model with symmetric delegation, optimal subsidy under market share delegation lies between simple Cournot competition and sales delegation. Furthermore, because the social welfare under market share delegation is large than those of sales delegation case, so even two export firms still involve in a ”Prisoner's Dilemma”, but market share delegation is in less degree.
主题分类 社會科學 > 經濟學
参考文献
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  7. Vickers, J.(1985).Delegation and the Theory of the Firm.Economic Journal,95,138-147.
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