同時互動遊說與策略性貿易政策－Bertrand-Nash競爭分析

Simultaneous Lobbying and Strategic Trade Policy-Bertrand-Nash Competition Analysis

10.30087/APEMR.200903.0002

王騰坤

策略性貿易政策 ； 階段性賽局 ； 遊說 ； 價格競爭 ； Strategic Trade Policy ； Staged Game ； Lobby ； Price Competition

亞太經濟管理評論

12卷2期（2009 / 03 / 01）

31 - 60

繁體中文

遊說是影響政策制訂時所觀察到的現象，會對社會福利造成負面的影響。歷史的經驗告訴我們，政府部門會受限於政治的壓力來影響其決策行為。本文將針對遊說效果在廠商價格設定下之複占模型來作為分析討論。當僅有本國或外國廠商涉入遊說活動時，其可信的結果是不要去遊說會對全體福利水準較好。內生決定之遊說行為會扭曲與策略性貿易政策事先預期下之不同結果，但如果讓本國廠商與外國廠商同時遊說時，在本文的分析中其可信的結果是要跟著競爭者去遊說，而對全體福利水準的評估會大於僅有單方進行遊說的情形。本研究採用三階段性賽局之分析方法來探討廠商行為以及影響政府對貿易政策的決定，並透過遊說比較密度的設計，來看誰具有較大的遊說力量，其分析結果將有助於政府做為決策的依據。

Lobbying is an observed phenomenon to influence the policy-making and be costly in terms of social welfare. Historical experience tells us that governments are subject to political pressure to affect its decision. This article studies the duopolistic model of price-setting firms by considering simultaneously lobbying efforts. When a domestic firm engaged in lobbying activities, it could credibly commit not to lobby, neither did foreign one. Endogenously decided lobbying may distort the results from its original expectation in strategic trade policy. If we allow the domestic and foreign firms to lobby simultaneously, it could credibly commit to engage in lobbying with its competitor. The results shown that the influence of welfare under simultaneous lobbying will greater than under unilateral lobbying. A three-staged game is applied to analyze the firm’s behaviors and influence the decision of government trade policies. The design of the competitive lobbying degree of intensity is benefit for the government to realize the behavior of simultaneous lobbying.

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