雙頭寡占市場中貸款承諾與管理授權契約之分析

Analysis of Loan Commitment and Management Delegation Contracts in Duopoly Market

張啟迪；連旭蓓

管理委託授權 ； 銷售激勵 ； 市場份額激勵 ； 貸款承諾 ； Managerial Delegation ； Market Share Delegation ； Sales Delegation ； Loan Commitments

亞太經濟管理評論

24卷1&2期（2021 / 03 / 01）

39 - 47

繁體中文

我們考慮一個三階段的委託代理賽局，兩個競爭的公司必須為他們計畫的均衡生產水準安排融資。當企業所有者選擇了最佳貸款水準時，他們可以選擇銷售或市場份額作為管理激勵。市場份額委託下的均衡利益和產量低於銷售委託，而均衡利潤則相反。

We consider a three-stage delegation game with two competing firms which must arrange financing for the production levels they plan to undertake in equilibrium. The owners could choose sales or market share for managerial incentives when they have chosen the best loan level. We can show the equilibrium interest and production are lower under market share delegation than under sales delegation, while the equilibrium profit is higher by contrary.

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