汪張交惡事件再探討（1932年）

A Reinvestigation on How Wang and Zhang Came Into Conflict (1932)

10.7058/BAH.200309.0097

周美華(Mei-Hwa Chou)

蔣介石 ； 汪兆銘 ； 張學良 ； 抗日 ； 熱河防守問題 ； Chiang Kai-shek ； Wang Ching-wei ； Zhang Xue-liang ； Fighting Against the Japanese Invasion ； Defense Issues in Rehe

國史館學術集刊

3期（2003 / 09 / 01）

97 - 127

繁體中文

1932年8月初，時任行政院長的汪兆銘突然通電辭職，並斥責張學良「藉抵抗之名，以事聚斂」，要求張學良同辭。為此，行政院總辭，汪張二人亦隔空叫陣，一時之間，軍政各界騷動，一場政治風暴，隱然開展。 過去有關此一問題的探討，著重於汪為什麼要發動政潮？又為何選擇張為攻訐對象？剖題明確，但焦點卻集中於蔣（介石）汪之間的權力爭鬥，而將張視為汪與蔣抗衡的「靶子」。事實上，「權力爭鬥」並不是衡量問題原委的唯一標準。近年，有人指出不應忽略汪在「對日問題」上的認真與急迫態度，基本上提供了另一角度的思考，但就事件的發展和背後所隱含的意象而言，還是不夠的。 本文以汪張互訐電文所呈現的問題，對照目前的研究論點，利用國史館典藏的《蔣中正總統檔案》、《閻錫山檔案》，以及相關的資料文獻，從汪兆銘因應時局的想法、態度，和蔣汪張三人的抗日理念著手。結果發現：蔣汪張三人其實都希望中國能對日進行抵抗，只是站在各自的利害關係考量上，抵抗的時機和條件有所差別罷了。汪肩負政治責任，承受輿論壓力，傾向於「無條件抗戰」。即不論準備與否，勝負不計，打了再說。而張站在東北軍的立場，要求的是「統籌抗戰」，在中央未有準備和決心以前，寧可避免與日發生衝突，也不願以東北軍作「瓦碎」似的犧牲。基本上，汪張交惡的引爆點，就在這一急一緩、立場各異的抗日態度上。而蔣基於中日國力對比的考量，和自身對共軍發展的疑懼，深信「攘外必先安內，統一方能禦侮」，所以目標是放在「安內」上，對日則傾向於「緩兵備戰」。因此，蔣對汪張交惡事件的因應，著重在「維持現狀，安定政局」，以便早日完成剿共軍事，但仍要求張進兵熱河，以資準備。 如此，三人基於利害關係的考量不同，在抵抗問題上的步調不一，又不肯開誠布公的協商討論，才會相互猜疑，進而導致此一事件的發生。

In the early August of 1932, Prime Minister Wang Ching-wei (汪精衛) suddenly telegrammed to request a resignation and also asked Zhang Xue-liang (張學良) to resign his post too-accusing Zhang of ”drawing together his crowds in the false name of national defense. ”Because of this incident, all the administrative officials of the Executive Yuan resigned as Zhang and Wang scolding each other. At that time, the political storm among the military and political circles began to shape. The discussion of this very problem in the past focused on why Wang initiated the political turbulence and why Zhang was selected as the target of attack. The analysis of this problem such way had a clear premise while the focus was on the power struggle between Chiang kai-shek (蔣介石) and Wang, taking Zhang as a ”bull's eye” of the confrontation between Chiang and Wang. As a matter of fact, ”power struggle” is by no means the only criterion to measure the root of this problem. Of recent years, some scholars proposed that we should not ignore Wang's earnest and urgent attitude on ”issues toward Japan.” This alternative analysis presented another perspective that helped clarify the root of this problem. But this argument still seemed inadequate in explaining how the event went along and what hidden implication the event had. This paper on the one hand discusses the problems presented on the telegrams where Wang and Zhang attacked each other, studies the current research arguments in question, and makes use of the relevant historical documents available in Academia Historica, including ”The Chiang Kai-shek Collections” and ”The Yen Hsi-shan Collections”. By analyzing Wang's ideas and attitudes toward the political situations at that time and by understanding the basic ideology that hid behind the Trio's fighting against the Japanese invasion, we discover that all the three political figures actually stand in the same positions: they hope China could fight against the Japanese imperialism. What makes them different is when and how China should respond with wars since the three individuals have their own base of benefits. Wang, who takes responsibility in politics and has to face pressure from the press, is liable to have ”unconditional fighting back”: no matter whether China is well prepared or whether the war could be won or lost, the first principle is to fight back the Japanese in no time. Zhang, who stands in the position of the Northeastern army, asks to have a ”all set fighting”: the Chinese try best to avoid any battles with the Japanese unless the Central Government is well-prepared and highly determined. He does not want the Northeastern army fighting along in the wars. Basically this different viewpoint results in the conflict between Wang and Zhang: one believes that the war is urgent and immediate while the other insists on delaying it. At the same time, Chiang who takes into account the huge gap in national power between China and Japan, and who expresses fear on the fast progress of the Communist Army, believes that the Chinese are ”not able to fight against external invasion unless we can have domestic problems settled and the whole nation gets internally united.” So the priority for Chiang lies in ”having domestic problems settled” and his attitude toward Japan is therefore: ”get ourselves prepared and wait.” Thus, Chiang's response to the conflict between Wang and Zhang remains to be: ”keep the current situations and ensure a stable political environments”, in order to complete the sacred mission to eliminate the Communist army and to get prepared for the war by making a request that Zhang drives his force to Rehe (熱河). This way, the Trio obviously have a conflict of interests and have disharmonious steps in facing the Japanese invasion-without being willing to negotiate the related problems openly. Since they are doubtful of each other, the unfortunate event thus happened.

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