题名

論跨機關管制行政之政策協調:賽局理論的觀點

并列篇名

An Analysis of Policy Coordination of Cross-agency Regulatory Administration: A Game Theoretic Perspective

DOI

10.29865/PAP.201412_(59).0003

作者

廖洲棚(Zhou-Peng Liao)

关键词

管制行政 ; 跨機關執行 ; 政策協調 ; 賽局理論 ; 空間模型 ; Regulatory administration ; Cross-agency implementation ; Policycoordination ; Game theory ; Spatial model

期刊名称

行政暨政策學報

卷期/出版年月

59期(2014 / 12 / 01)

页次

89 - 126

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

管制行政為政府的核心功能之一,其透過直接的命令控制或間接的經濟誘因等方式干預民眾行為,達成預定的管制政策目標。隨著多元化社會的發展,管制政策目標多涉及數個行政機關權責,使得愈來愈多的管制行政呈現出跨機關執行的型態。本文從賽局理論的觀點,運用空間模型演繹跨機關管制行政的政策協調邏輯。作者先從管制政策的制度特徵,定義管制行政的空間結構以及參與管制行政機關的效用模型。其次透過賽局空間模型的演繹,推導出八項跨機關管制政策協調的研究命題。文末則依據研究成果提出數項具公共管理意涵的研究發現以及後續的研究建議。

英文摘要

Regulatory policy is one of the government core function by which it intervenes in citizen's behaviors through direct command and control regulation or indirect economic incentives to achieve the policy goals. However, owing to the development of a plural society, a regulatory policy usually not only involves in several agencies' goals, but also involves in cross-agency implementation. This article addresses to explain the crossagency regulatory policy coordination by using a game theoretic approach. First, the author defined the space structure of regulatory implementation from the characteristics of the institutions of regulatory policy. Second, the author used the concept of utility loss to propose the utility function of an agency which implements a cross-agency regulatory policy. Third, a spatial model of game theory was used to interpret the logic of policy coordination in cross-agency regulatory administration and deduced 8 propositions. Finally, this article provided several managerial implications for public managers and suggested some research designs and methods for future study.

主题分类 社會科學 > 社會科學綜合
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