總統非立法權與總理總統制國家的憲政運作：以法國、芬蘭、斯洛伐克、羅馬尼亞為例

The President's Non-legislative Power and Constitutional Operation of Premier-presidential Regime: Comparing France, Finland, Slovakia and Romania

10.29865/PAP.202312_(77).0003

張峻豪(Chun-Hao Chang)

半總統制 ； 總理總統制 ； 總統 ； 總理 ； 非立法權 ； semi-presidential system ； premier-presidential regime ； president ； prime minister ； non-legislative power

行政暨政策學報

77期（2023 / 12 / 01）

67 - 95

繁體中文;英文

本文挑選總統未有免職總理權的「總理總統制」國家，整合總統任命總理權、解散國會權，即總統的「非立法權」，將兩項權力進行組合，分析總統、總理、國會之間的負責及制衡關係是否落實、如何落實，以理解總統行使非立法權的憲政影響。在具體作法上，本文透過四個「總理總統制」個案：法國、羅馬尼亞、芬蘭、斯洛伐克，在不同的非立法權所影響「總統決策權行使」、「倒閣是否發生」，「政府存續力」等變項，比較「總理總統制」的運作穩定度。本文發現，若總統非立法權較大，將不至於使共治無法出現，反而總統會在一致政府時期，積極影響內閣佈局，並透過解散國會以避免共治產生，因此，總統在府會不一致之下選擇節制權力，將是較佳的政治行動策略。相對地，當總統的非立法權較弱，總統將在法令推動上，與政府及國會更積極對抗，使「總理總統制」與政府的穩定無法劃上等號，另外，若總統還想以其保留領域權來達到權力顛覆，更可能危及總統憲政地位，甚至造成總統權力減損之後果。

This study analyzed semi-presidential countries with premier-presidential regimes, in which the president does not have the power to dismiss the prime minister but has non-legislative power to appoint the prime minister and dissolve the parliament. This study analyzed the relationships between the president, prime minister and congress and how accountability and checks and balances are implemented for determining the constitutional effects of the president's exercise of non-legislative power. This study examined four cases of premier-presidential regimes: France, Romania, Finland, and Slovakia. Various non-legislative powers affect the exercise of the presidential decision-making power, regardless of cabinet collapse, government viability, and other factors. This study also explored the operational stability of the premier-presidential regime and discovered that the president having the power to appoint the prime minister does not affect the occurrence of cohabitation. In periods of divided government, the president is involved in the allocation of cabinet personnel; however, the president's power to dismiss congress is a crucial weapon and can prevent cohabitation. When the non-legislative power of the president is weak, the president can affect congress and other aspects of the government through legislative power. However, this increases the instability of the constitutional government and may detract from the political prestige and power of the president.

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