真調會條例急速處分的憲法訴訟問題

Problems of Constitutional Litigation Involved in Emergent Disposition of the Truth Investigation Committee

10.30094/NCCULJ.200504.0003

吳信華(Hsin-Hua Wu)

大法官 ； 大法官會議 ； 憲法法庭 ； 憲法訴訟 ； 暫時性權利保護 ； 急速處分 ； 暫時處分 ； 真調會條例 ； Grand Justice ； Constitutional litigation ； temporary protection of rights ； emergent disposition ； temporary disposition ； The Law to Govern the Truth Investigation Committee

中正大學法學集刊

18期（2005 / 04 / 01）

139 - 182

繁體中文

由於民國九十三年三月十九日所發生的「總統槍擊事件」事實真象如何，以及是否影響第二天的總統選舉結果，各方均爭議不斷。立法院於同年八月通過「三一九槍擊事件真相調查特別委員會條例」（「真調會條例」），欲組成一特別委員會調查此一事件。其後有三分之一立法委員聲請釋憲，認為本條例嚴重侵害司法獨立，並違反人權與正當法律程序的保障，請求大法官將之宣告違憲，而同時於聲請書上亦一併請求大法官宣告「急速處分」以暫時停止本條例之適用。由於司法院大法官審理案件法中對急速處分並未有直接規定，大法官究竟能否、或如何為之，此問題遂引發各界爭議。本文即自「憲法訴訟」的觀點，分析吾國現今大法官為急速處分的相關法律問題，首先即說明在均無直接明文規定之情形下，大法官可否，以及如何類推適用行政訴訟法之規定以填補此一疏漏，而其界限又何在？其次，本案審理復有諸多問題仍有待解決，例如：創設急速處分的形式、內容、時限、可決人數甚至救濟等，均有待更精緻化的思考，而絕非「大法官身為釋憲程序之主宰者，或暫時性權利保護制度為訴訟權之核心」的簡單思考，即謂大法官即可自創程序為之。 又本文完成後，大法官作成釋字第五八五號解釋，其中關於「急速處分」（「暫時處分」）之說明約略為「保全制度係司法權之核心，於憲法訴訟中亦同，大法官於本案中因此亦有權為暫時處分，然本案實體解釋既已作成，則對此即暫無公要為之。」然本文以為大法官實則並未解決一個在吾國現制下應屬急速處分的核心、同時亦為本文重點的問題，亦即在現今缺乏法律明文規定之情形下，大法官如何踐行其程序以作成急速處分，及其他附隨之憲法訴訟程序應如何解決？讀者或許可就此參酌印證本文論點與大法官於本號釋字中之相關闡釋，甚至（聲請人及大法官之）鑑定人之鑑定書意見，以對於急速處分的憲法訴訟問題為全盤必要之瞭解。

There are restless debates as to the truth of ”the President's gun shut incidence” on March 19, 2004 and its possible impacts on the result of the next-day President election. In response, the Legislative Yuan passed the Law to Govern the 319 Gun-Shut Incidence Truth Investigation Committee (the Truth Investigation Committee) to set up a specified Committee to inspect the gun shut incidence. After its making, one third of the Legislators applied for a judicial interpretation on the ground that the Law had seriously infringed judicial independence as well as human rights and due process of law. The application was for the Grand Justice to declare the Law unconstitutional and to announce an ”emergent disposition” to halt the application of the Law temporarily. As ”emergent disposition” is not regulated under the Law Governing the Disposition of Cases by the Grand Justice, it is highly contested whether and how the Grand Justice should exercise such power. This paper thus intends to analyse, from the aspect of ”Constitutional litigation”, relevant issues concerning the proclamation of an ”emergent disposition” by the Grand Justice in this country. It first discerns the possibilities of applying the Administrative Litigation Law mutatis matandis to make up the loopholes of the law and its boundaries. There are also other problems to be solved regarding this judicial interpretation including, for example, to create the formalities, contents, time limits, vote counting, relieves, and so on. Such problems need to be considered ornately instead of simply stating that the Grand Justice may initiate the procedure because ”the Grand Justice is in charge of judicial interpretation” or ”the temporary protection of rights is the nucleus of litigation right”. After the completion of this paper, the Grand Justice made Judicial Interpretation No.585, which refers to ”emergent disposition” as ”temporary disposition” and acknowledged, ”the security system is the core of litigation right, and so is it in Constitutional litigation. The Grand Justice is thus empowered to announce a temporary disposition. However, the present case has been solved by an interpretation in substantial terms, there is thus no punctual need to pronounce a temporary disposition”. Nevertheless, this paper argues that the Grand Justice has failed to tackle the main issues properly - in the absence of a law to govern the ”emergent disposition”, how does the Grand Justice authorised to initiate the procedure and how to tackle other problems involving Constitutional litigation, which are also the focal points of this paper. In order to reach essential understanding over issues of Constitutional litigation involved in emergent disposition, the readers may compare and contrast amplifications of this paper with relevant elaborations in the text or expert reports of Interpretation 585.

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