我們和未來世代之間的道德關係：跨世代正義如何可能？

OUR MORAL RELATION TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:ON THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE

戴華(Hua Tai)

跨世代正義 ； 道德責任和權利 ； 意志論vs利益論 ； 「非同一」的問題 ； 正義的情境 ； 帕菲特 ； 羅爾斯 ； Intergenerational justice ； Moral duties and rights ； The will theory vs the interest theory ； The non-identity problem ； The circumstances of justice ； Parfit ； Rawls

臺灣經濟預測與政策

46卷2期（2016 / 03 / 01）

159 - 184

繁體中文

目前人類所發展出來的科技, 以古人難以想像的程度改善了人類福祉。可是, 假設幾百年後的地球上仍有人類存在。我們對於現代科技的運用若未能加以適當管制，很可能讓這些未來出現的人類存在於一個難以忍受的生活環境中。一般人相信，我們若明知故犯，不願積極地採取必要的措施去避免這樣的苦難發生在他們身上，到時候就會傷害他們，因此犯下道德上不可原諒的錯誤, 或者無論如何侵犯了他們的基本人權。根據這個信念，我們對於這些未來人類擔負著道德責任，而且這些責任乃奠基在所謂「跨世代正義」的考量上。然而，有些哲學家認為，一般人之所以會抱持這個信念，是因為他們誤用了有關「道德權利」、「傷害」、乃至於「正義」等相關概念，以致誤導了自己。在這些哲學家看來，對於那些和我們生命期不相重疊的人類未來世代，我們若要理解自己和他們之間的道德關係，這些概念其實都派不上用場。這些哲學家想堅持的立場是：即使我們確實應該關切未來人類的福祉，這樣的關切至多建立在與「慈善」相關的責任上，而無關乎「正義」或「不傷害他人」之類的道德考量。本文試圖針對這個保守立場來為上述一般人的信念進行辯護。

We have developed technologies which have so far improved human wellbeing to an extent unimaginable to our ancestors. But suppose there will still be human beings living on earth hundreds of years from now. It is very likely that, if not properly regulated, our employment of these technologiesmay leave those future people with an environment unbearable for them to live in. Ordinary people would believe that if we knowingly don't do whatever is necessary to prevent such things from happening to them, we will harm them in an unforgivably wrongful way, or in any case violate their basic human rights when they come to exist. According to this belief, we have moral duties toward these future peoplewhich are based on considerations of so-called ＂intergenerational justice＂. However, some philosophers think that this belief is misguided as a result of one'smisuse of the concepts involved therein, namely, those of ＂moral rights＂, ＂harm＂, and even ＂justice＂. For them, these concepts have no use when it comes to understanding ourmoral relation to peoplewhose life-span does not overlap ours. They would insist that even though we ought by all means to care about the well-being of these future people, this does not stem from duties of justice or of ＂do no harm＂, but at most from duties of beneficence. This article seeks to defend the ordinary belief in question against such a conservative view.

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