高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發佈之影響

The Effects of CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Voluntary Disclosures

10.30139/JACG.200706.0003

張瑞當(Ruey-Dang Chang)；林國欽(Kuo-Chin Lin)；沈文華(Wen-Hua Shen)；侯佩秀(Pei-Hsiu Hou)

薪酬績效敏感度 ； 自願性揭露 ； 自願性財務預測 ； 資訊內涵 ； Pay-Performance Sensitivity ； Voluntary Disclosure ； Voluntary Financial Forecasts ； Information Content

會計與公司治理

4卷1期（2007 / 06 / 01）

57 - 84

繁體中文

本文主要目的在於探討公司高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發佈之影響。本研究首先利用公司高階經理人薪酬水準與公司經營績效，計算公司高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度，再將公司年報中之自願性資訊揭露區分為五大類，利用內容分析法來衡量公司整體的揭露水準。另外，本研究也針對公司在發佈自願性財務預測後對股價的影響，以檢測公司自願性財務預測的資訊內涵。經由實證分析，本研究發現具有高薪酬績效敏感度之公司，其自願性資訊揭露的水準較高；而且當公司薪酬績效敏感度較高時，其自願性財務預測的資訊內涵程度也相對較高。

The purpose of the study is to investigate the effects of CEO pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) on the company's voluntary disclosures. Executive salaries and operating performances of the companies were first computed to derive the PPS of the CEO. The voluntary disclosure items on the company's annual reports were divided into five categories and the content analysis method was then conducted to measure the level of the company's disclosure. In addition, the effects of the voluntary financial forecasts on the company's stock price were measured to determine the information contents of the voluntary financial forecasts. The empirical results indicate that companies with high PPS have a higher level of voluntary disclosure as well as higher information contents of the voluntary financial forecasts.

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