题名

台灣上市公司自由現金流量與營收成長是否影響公司績效？縱橫門檻迴歸模型之運用

并列篇名

Do Free Cash Flow and Sale Growth Affect Firm Performance in Taiwan? Application of Panel Threshold Model

DOI

10.30139/JACG.201006.0001

作者

林鳳麗(Feng-Li Lin)；廖育旻(Yu-Min Liao)

关键词

自由現金流量 ； 代理理論 ； 營收成長 ； Free cash flow ； Agency theory ； Sale growth

期刊名称

會計與公司治理

卷期/出版年月

7卷1期（2010 / 06 / 01）

页次

1 - 29

内容语文

繁體中文
中文摘要

本研究嘗試連結代理理論之自由現金流量假說和內部治理機制強弱，以1996年至2006年之183家台灣上市公司為研究樣本，利用Hansen(1999)所提出之縱橫門檻迴歸模型進行分析，探討營收成長與公司績效之間是否存在門檻效果與非線性關係。結果顯示：(1)過高的自由現金流量，將誘使管理者從事擴張策略或過度投資的情形。(2)內部人持股對公司績效之影響，結果支持利益掠奪假說。(3)營收成長愈高，公司績效愈好。但銷售成長到一定程度時，公司營運將受到外部競爭者之影響。(4)在探討營收成長與公司績效關係中，加入自由現金流量為一門檻變數後，發現自由現金流量存在三個門檻效果，門檻值分別為18.48%、28.51%和34.40%，且自由現金流量愈多將促使營收成長對公司績效有正向影響，但該影響力卻有趨緩的現象。(5)在探討營收成長與公司績效關係中，加入內部人持股為一門檻變數後，發現內部人持股存在三個門檻效果，門檻值分別為26.34%、28.09%和45.25%，除內部人持股介於26.34%到28.09%，營收成長對公司績效呈現負向關係之外，其餘皆呈現正向關係。
英文摘要

The aim of this paper is to connect free cash flow hypothesis of agency theory and internal governance mechanisms and to study the relationship between sales growth and firm performance. We find that there is a double threshold effect between free cash flow (FCF) and firm performance, which are 28.51% and 34.40%. These results indicate that firm with too high FCF may induce management to pursue an 'empire building' strategy or to over invest. There is only single threshold effect between insider ownership and firm performance, which is 39.74% in consistency with the entrenchment hypothesis. There is only single threshold effect between sale growth and firm performance, which is 113.36%, the higher sale growth the better firm performance. However, the sale growth stops at a certain level. There is a triple threshold effect among sale growth and firm performance, which are 18.48%, 28.51%, and 34.40%. The FCF may promote the positive relationship between sale growth and firm performance, but it becomes slow. The insider ownership used as a threshold variable, there is a triple threshold effect among sale growth and firm performance, which are 26.34%, 28.09%, and 45.25%. Except insider ownership between 26.34% and 28.09%, the negative relationship exists between sale growth and firm performance. These results indicate that weaker internal government mechanism, agency cost and supervising cost will increase and the firm performance will decrease.
主题分类 社會科學 > 財金及會計學
社會科學 > 管理學
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