题名

委外服務之稽核政策分析

并列篇名

A Study on Outsourcing Service Audit Policy

作者

郭瑞基(Ruey-Ji Guo);馬嘉應(Chia-Ying Ma);施瑩焄(Ying Hsun Shih)

关键词

委外 ; 資訊不對稱 ; 稽核政策 ; Outsourcing ; Information asymmetry ; Audit policy

期刊名称

會計與公司治理

卷期/出版年月

14卷1期(2019 / 06 / 01)

页次

23 - 39

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

在企業普遍採行委外服務作業,以降低營運成本、增進經營效率的同時,也衍生出相關服務品質可能因此下滑的問題。本文藉由模式分析,探討稽核行動在委外服務品質控制上的應用。研究結果顯示,在委外服務稽核政策上,只要提升服務品質所增加之執行成本不是相當的大,即存在有嚇阻(促使)受委託廠商採取低(高)品質服務之空間。再者,當嚇阻(促使)受委託廠商提供低(高)品質服務為最適的政策目標時,若提供高品質服務而不提供低品質服務,其所增加的執行成本相對較低(不顯著),則企業個體的稽核政策將僅在產生較高的顧客抱怨次數時,始會採取必要的隨機稽核行動;而在產生較低的顧客抱怨次數時,將不進行任何稽核。惟若高、低服務品質之執行成本差異相對顯著(但非相當大),則企業個體的稽核政策將轉變為除了在產生較低的顧客抱怨次數時,採取必要的隨機稽核行動外,其在產生較高的顧客抱怨次數時,更將執行全面的稽核。

英文摘要

Outsourcing services are generally adopted by enterprises. To alleviate the moral hazard concerning service quality, enterprises can undertake adequate audit action on service quality related. This paper finds that, when the cost of implementing high-quality service significantly outnumbers that of implementing low-quality service, the enterprise's optimal audit policy is to undertake a complete audit on the service supplier even if it cannot provide sufficient incentive to make the latter to offer high-quality service. Nevertheless, if the increased cost in implementing high-quality service instead of low-quality service is not significant, it is possible for the enterprise to undertake a deterrent (random) audit policy to induce the service supplier to offer high-quality service.

主题分类 社會科學 > 財金及會計學
社會科學 > 管理學
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