公司治理與高階管理者薪酬關係之研究－以金融業為例

A Study on the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Top Managers' Compensation-The Case of the Financial Industry in Taiwan

林鳳儀(Feng-Yi Lin)；李錦秋(Chin-Chiu Lee)

公司治理 ； 高階管理者薪酬 ； Corporate governance ； Top managers' compensation

會計與公司治理

14卷1期（2019 / 06 / 01）

41 - 57

繁體中文

金融業除了是資金流通的主要平台，也是國家社會經濟運轉的血液，因此各國政府對金融業之規範較嚴謹繁複。公司治理是所有企業生存發展的核心關鍵，其主要範疇包括激勵連結與監督。激勵連結是以激勵高階管理者而使其為全體股東謀求最佳利益，例如高階管理者之薪酬計畫與公司績效連結；監督則是要透過內外部資源，例如董事會，控制持股比率，內部控制之制度及公司經營績效等。過往文獻大都探討非金融業的公司治理、公司績效與高階管理者薪酬的關聯性，本文則以公司治理的觀點來探討金融業公司治理與高階管理者薪酬之關係。本研究發現，在金融業公司治理方面，董事會的規模愈大、內控制度未落實、控制持股比率愈高以及資訊揭露之透明度愈高，高階管理者擁有高薪資水準的可能性愈低。本研究係以金融業的基本資料進行基本分析，藉由迴歸分析進行驗證與探討金融業的公司治理與高階管理者薪酬之關係。

Financial industry is not only the main platform of capital flow, but also the blood of social and economic operation for a country; therefore, many governments set complicated regulations to financial industries. Corporate governance is the core key of survival and development to all the enterprises, and the major scope of corporate governance is inclusive of incentive connection and supervision. Incentive connection is to motivate top managers making them seek for the best benefits for the whole shareholders, such as the compensation plan of top managers' compensation and business performance. Supervision is through internal and external resources, such as the board of directors, controlling shareholding ratio, internal control system and company operating performance. The study found that for corporate governance in financial industry, the larger scale of board of the director, internal control is not implement, the higher ratio of stock hold, and the higher transparency of information disclosure, those imply the less possibility of high compensation for top managers. This study uses financial data to proceed analysis, to inspect the relativity between the variables by using Pearson Correlation Coefficient Analysis, finally, to verify the results by regression analysis so as to further understand the relevance between corporate governance and top managers' compensation.

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