题名

公司政治關聯對購買董監事責任保險需求之影響

并列篇名

The Impact of Political Connection on Demand Purchases of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance

作者

彭玉玲(Yu-Ling Peng)；劉政淮(Cheng-Hwai Liou)；吳明政(Ming-Cheng Wu)

关键词

政治關聯 ； 董監事責任保險 ； 訴訟風險 ； Politically connected firms ； Director' and officer' liability insurance ； Litigation Risk

期刊名称

會計與公司治理

卷期/出版年月

15卷1期（2020 / 06 / 01）

页次

29 - 59

内容语文

繁體中文
中文摘要

本研究旨在探討企業之董事會成員結構之背景是否因為具有政治關聯因素，致影響到企業購買董監事責任保險（D&O責任保險）的需求。本研究根據董事會成員是否擔任過中央政府官員、民意代表及相關政黨工作等職位作為董事會政治關聯的主要變數。董事會成員分別就台灣2008年至2014年之上市上櫃公司為研究對象，實證結果發現，具有政治關聯董事會之企業可能透過政治尋租的方式取得較優惠的條件進而從事高風險行為，及經由政治關聯因素致造成公司治理體制薄弱，而增加違約及訴訟風險。若進一步區分政治關聯屬性為具有中央政府官員、民意代表與政黨黨職等三類，發現董事具有中央政府官員背景的公司，顯著易於購買D&O責任保險，且傾向於超額購買D&O責任保險，此表示董事成員擔任中央政府官員一職時，較易接觸政府施政核心，易透過政治關聯取得優惠政策，進而引發道德風險，誘使機會主義行為形成，因此會購買超額D&O責任保險來分擔訴訟風險。
英文摘要

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the board member's political connection is associated with corporation's risk of litigation, and examines whether firms tend to purchase directors' and officers' liability insurance(hereafter D&O). In the study, the main issues are based on whether the members of the board of directors served as central government officials, representatives of political parties and related work and other positions as a political association. Using Taiwanese listed firms from year 2008 to 2014, we find that board member's political connection may obtain more favorable terms through political rent-seeking ways and increase financial leverage, engage in high-risk behavior, and increase the default and the risk of litigation and therefore have an incentive to purchase D&O liability insurance, and more insurance coverage. Future investigation shows that a company with a central government-related background director is easy to purchase D&O liability insurance and excess D&O liability insurance than public opinion representatives and political party positions, It means that members of the board of directors who serve as central government officials are likely to obtain preferential policies through political connections, which in turn leads to moral hazard and induces opportunistic behavior. Therefore, they will purchase excess D&O liability insurance to share the risk of litigation.
主题分类 社會科學 > 財金及會計學
社會科學 > 管理學
参考文献
  1. 紀信義 ,翁慈青 ,廖芝嫻,黃馨儀(2017)。董事及高階主管政治關聯與公司績效之關聯性。台大管理論叢，27(2)，1-34。
    連結：
  2. 紀信義,翁慈青,黃馨儀(2016)。董事會政治關連與財務報表重編之關係。中山管理評論，24(3)，409-445。
    連結：
  3. 翁慈青,紀信義(2014)。董事會政治背景與企業信用風險之關係。證券市場發展季刊，26(2)，43-89。
    連結：
  4. 陳彩稚,龐嘉慧(2008)。董監事暨重要職員責任保險之需求因素分析。台大管理論叢，18(2)，171-195。
    連結：
  5. Adhikari, A.,Derashid, C.,Zhang, H.(2006).Public policy, political connections, and effective tax rates: Longitudinal evidence from Malaysia.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,25(5),574-595.
  6. Agrawal, A.,Knoeber, C. R.(1996).Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders.The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,31(3),377-397.
  7. Anderson R. C.,Mansi, S. A.,Reeb, D. M.(2003).Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt.Journal of Financial Economics,68(2),263-285.
  8. Ang, J. S.,Ding, D. K.,Thong, T. Y.(2013).Political connection and firm value.Asian Development Review,30(2),131-166.
  9. Ashbaugh-Skaife, H.,Collins, D. W.,LaFond, R.(2006).The effects of corporate governance on firms ' credit ratings.Journal of Accounting and Economics,42(1),203-243.
  10. Bliss, M. A.,Gul, F. A.(2012).Political connection and cost of debts: Some Malaysian evidence.Journal of Banking and Finance,36(5),1520-1527.
  11. Boubakri, N.,J. C. Cosset,Saffar, W.(2008).Political connections of newly privatized firms.Journal of Corporate Finance,14(5),654-673.
  12. Boubakri, N.,Mansi, S. A.,Saffar, W.(2013).Political institutions, connectedness, and corporate risk-taking.Journal of International Business Studies,44(3),195-215.
  13. Boubakri, N.,Mishra, D.,Saffar, W.(2012).Political connections and the cost of equity capital.Journal of Corporate Finance,18(3),541-559.
  14. Brockman, P.,Rui, O. M.,Zou, H.(2013).Institutions and the performance of politically connected M&As.Journal of International Business Studies,44(8),833-852.
  15. Chalmers, J. M.,Dann, L. Y.,Harford, J(2002).Managerial opportunism? Evidence from directors ' and officers' insurance purchases.The Journal of Finance,57(2),609-636.
  16. Chan K. H.,Lin, K. Z.,Mo, P..A political - economic analysis of auditor reporting and auditor switches.Review of Accounting Studies,11(1),21-48.
  17. Chaney, P.,Faccio, M.,Parsley, D.(2011).The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms.Journal of Accounting and Economics,51(1),58-76.
  18. Chen, C. J. P.,Ding, Y.,Kim, C.(2010).High - level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world.Journal of International Business Studies,41(9),1505-1524.
  19. Chen, G. Z.,Edmund, C. K.(2018).Directors ' and officers ' legal liability insurance and internal control weaknesses.Journal of International Accounting Research,17(1),69-86.
  20. Chen, K. C. W.,Chen, Z.,Wei, K. C. J.(2009).Legal protection of investors, corporate governance, and the cost of equity capital.Journal of Corporate Finance,15(3),273-289.
  21. Chen, T. J.,Li, S. H.(2010).Directors ' and officers ' insurance, corporate governance and firm performance.International Journal of Disclosure and Governance,7(3),244-261.
  22. Chung, H. H.,Wynn, J. P.(2008).Managerial legal liability coverage and earnings conservatism.Journal of Accounting and Economics,46(1),135-153.
  23. Cingano, F.,Pinotti, P.(2013).Politicians at work: The private returns and social costs of political connections.Journal of the European Economic Association,11(2),433-465.
  24. Coffee, J. C.(1999).Privatization and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure.Journal of Corporation Law,25(1),1-37.
  25. Core, J.(1997).On the corporate demand for directors' and officers' insurance.Journal of Risk and Insurance,64(1),63-87.
  26. Cull, R.,Xu, L(2005).Institutions, ownership, and finance: The determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms.Journal of Financial Economics,77(1),117-146.
  27. Dalton, D. R.,Daily, C. M.,Johnson, J. L.,Ellstrand, A. E.(1999).Number of directors and financial performance: A meta - analysis.Academy of Management Journal,42(6),674-686.
  28. de Montchrestien, A. 1889. L'Économie politique patronale. Traicté de l'oeconomie politique. Paris, Plon.
  29. Dechow, P. M.,Dichev, I. D.(2002).The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors.The Accounting Review,77(1),35-59.
  30. Dechow, P. M.,Sloan, R. G.,Sweeney, A. P.(1996).Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC.Contemporary Accounting Research,13(1),1-36.
  31. Du, X.,Luo, J. H.(2016).Political connections, home formal institutions, and internationalization: Evidence from China.Management and Organization Review,12(1),103-133.
  32. Faccio, M.(2010).Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A cross - country analysis.Financial Management,39(3),905-928.
  33. Faccio, M.(2006).Politically connected firms.American Economic Review,96(1),369-386.
  34. Fama, E. F,Jensen, M. C.(1983).Separation of ownership and control.Journal of Law and economics,26(2),301-325.
  35. Fan, J. P. H.,Wong, T. J.(2005).Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia.Journal of Accounting Research,43(1),35-72.
  36. Fan, J. P. H.,Wong, T. J.,Zhang, T.(2007).Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and post - IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms.Journal of Financial Economics,84(2),330-357.
  37. Fisman, R.(2001).Estimating the value of political connections.American Economic Review,91(4),1095-1102.
  38. Francis, B. B.,Hasan, I,Sun, X.(2009).Political connections and the process of going public: Evidence from China.Journal of International Money and Finance,28(4),696-719.
  39. Goldman, E.,Rocholl, J.,So, J(2009).Do politically connected boards affect firm value?.Review of Financial Studies,22(6),2331-2360.
  40. Guedhami, O.,Pittman, J. A.,Saffar, W.(2014).Auditor Choice in politically connected firms.Journal of Accounting Research,52(1),107-162.
  41. Gutiérrez, M.(2003).An economic analysis of corporate directors ' fiduciary duties.The Rand Journal of Economics,34(3),516-535.
  42. Holderness, C.(1990).Liability insurers as corporate monitors.International Review of Law and Economics,10(2),115-129.
  43. Johnson, S.,Mitton, T.(2003).Cronyism and capital controls: Evidence from Malaysia.Journal of Finance Economics,67(2),351-382.
  44. Khwaja, A. I.,Mian, A.(2005).Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,120(4),1371-1411.
  45. Leuz, C.,Oberholzer-Gee, F.(2006).Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia.Journal of Financial Economics,81(2),411-439.
  46. Li, H.,Meng, L.,Wang, Q,Zhou, L. A.(2008).Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms.Journal of Development Economics,87(2),283-299.
  47. Li, J. J.,Zhou, K. Z.,Shao, A. T.(2009).Competitive position, managerial ties, and profitability of foreign firms in China: An interactive perspective.Journal of International Business Studies,40(2),339-352.
  48. Li, W.,Lan, A. He. H.,Yiu, D.(2012).Political connections and corporate diversification in emerging economies: Evidence from China.Asia Pacific Journal of Management,29(3),799-818.
  49. Lin, K. Z.,Mills, L. F.,Zhang, F.,Li, Y.(2018).Do political connections weaken tax enforcement effectiveness?.Contemporary Accounting Research,35(4),1941-1972.
  50. Morck, R,Shleifer, A.,Vishny, R.W.(1988).Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis.Journal of Financial Economics,20(1),293-315.
  51. O'Sullivan, N.(2009).The impact of directors ' and officers ' insurance on audit pricing: Evidence from UK companies.Accounting Forum,33(1),146-161.
  52. O'Sullivan, N.(1997).Insuring the agents: The role of directors ' and officers ' insurance in corporate governance.Journal of Risk and Insurance,64(1),545-556.
  53. Pfeffer, J.,Salancik, G.(1978).The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective.New York:Harper and Row.
  54. Qian, M., H. Pan, and B. Yeung. 2011. Expropriation of minority shareholders in politically connected firms. The National University of Singapore. Unpublished working paper.
  55. Rajan, R.,Zingales, L.(1998).Financial dependence and growth.American Economic Review,88(3),559-586.
  56. Sharma, P.,Cheng, T. W. L.,Leung, T. Y.(2020).Impact of political connections on Chinese export firms ' performance - lessons for other emerging markets.Journal of Business Research,106,24-34.
  57. Shleifer, A.,Vishny, R. W.(1994).Political and firms.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,109(4),995-1025.
  58. Srinidhi, B.,Zhang, H.,Zhang, T.(2010).Political connection, transparency and auditor choice: Evidence from family-owned firms in China.4th Symposium of China Journal of Accounting Research
  59. Tu, G.,Lin, B. X.,Liu, F.(2013).Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,32(2),114-135.
  60. Watts, R.,Zimmerman, J.(1986).Positive Accounting Theory.Prentice-Hall.
  61. Wynn, J. P.(2008).Legal liability coverage and voluntary disclosure.The Accounting Review,83(6),1639-1669.
  62. 林宛瑩,許崇源,戚務君,陳宜伶(2009)。企業治理與信用風險。台大管理論叢，19(2)，71-98。
  63. 黃琴雅(2004)。博達效應：產險業者成大贏家。今周刊，397，102。
  64. 羅黨論,劉曉龍(2009)。政治關係、進入壁壘與企業績效—來自中國民營上市公司的經驗證據。管理世界，5，97-106。
print cancel