銀行業董事會忙碌性與銀行績效之關聯

The Linkage between Bank Board Busyness and Bank Performance

陳世炫(Shih-Hsuan Chen)；張元(Yuan Chang)

董事會忙碌性 ； CAMELS評等 ； Board Busyness ； CAMELS Ratings

會計與公司治理

16卷2期（2021 / 12 / 01）

1 - 35

繁體中文

本研究根據2008至2018年間34家臺灣公開發行銀行資料，檢驗董事會忙碌程度與CAMELS（Capital adequacy, Assets quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity of market risk）績效評等的關聯。董事同時兼任其他公司董事或其他機構職位，對於董事聲譽、管理見解、經驗及各項外部資源累積有正面助益，有益於董事職能發揮而促進績效；但董事身兼多職，對於原先任職組織應盡董事職責的承諾與努力被稀釋，負面影響績效。本研究計算各家銀行於不同年度中董事會成員同期間在其他公司或機構任職的職位總數以及平均每位董事兼任職位數作為董事會忙碌程度的指標，採用12個CAMELS評等指標作為銀行績效的代理變數。透過相關分析與多重迴歸估計發現，較高忙碌程度的董事會對應較佳的資本適足性、資產品質與較低的流動風險，但亦導致較差的管理能力與較大的市場風險敏感性。

Based on data of 34 banks in Taiwan through 2008~2018, this research examined the linkage between board busyness and CAMELS ratings indicators. As the degree of board busyness increases by greater number of director's job holding, the reputation, management knowledge and experience as well as tangible/intangible resources are accumulated and enhance efficiency on directors' managerial monitoring and advising. On the other hand, if a bank's directors have multiple job holding, the effort and commitment on board function of a specific bank are diluted, which has negative impact on performance. This research employed 7 indicators for bank board busyness and 12 indicators under CAMELS ratings system, and based on correlation analysis and multiple regression estimation, empirical evidence showed that greater degree of bank board busyness is associated with better performance on capital adequacy and liquidity risk but worse performance on management ability and greater market risk sensitivity.

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