题名

跨國企業公司治理結構之賽局理論分析

DOI

10.29850/LTJ.201112.0006

作者

李陳國；周少凱

关键词

跨國企業 ； 公司治理 ； 賽局模型

期刊名称

嶺東學報

卷期/出版年月

30期（2011 / 12 / 01）

页次

155 - 181

内容语文

繁體中文
中文摘要

本文運用賽局理論和方法，分析了跨國企業公司治理結構，構建了跨國企業母子公司靜態賽局模型，並分析了跨國企業母子公司結構的重複賽局過程，進而提出增強母公司的監督職能，在控制權與自主權之間進行平衡，對於解決跨國企業母子公司之間的委託-代理困境提供了新的思路。另外，對跨國企業子公司綜效治理的合作賽局模型進行了描述，提出了二階段動態賽局擴展式，並通過對賽局結果分析，得出綜效治理將促進子公司之間得到「雙贏」，對於解決跨國企業子公司之間的公司治理問題，發揮跨國企業整體綜效優勢，提供了有益的啟示。
主题分类 人文學 > 人文學綜合
人文學 > 歷史學
基礎與應用科學 > 資訊科學
社會科學 > 社會科學綜合
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