投資人對面板龍頭公司訴訟與策略宣告之市場反應

The Investor Response of Litigation and Strategy Announcement of Leading Panel Companies

10.53106/181345482024031801003

蔡璧徽(Bi-Huei Tsai)；王維揚(Wei-Yang Wang)

反托拉斯法 ； 市場反應 ； 生產線 ； 訴訟 ； 產能 ； Antitrust Laws ； Market Reaction ； Production Lines ； Litigation ； Capacity

多國籍企業管理評論

18卷1期（2024 / 03 / 01）

41 - 63

繁體中文;英文

本研究探討投資人對國際面板龍頭企業法律事故或企業決策的市場反應，本研究發現台灣友達公司遭判決違反美國反托拉斯法、中國大陸京東方公司宣布投資第二條10.5代生產線及韓國三星和京東方公司達成聯盟，台灣面板產業出現負向異常報酬。接著，本研究發現三星公司關閉8.5代生產線，台灣的面板產業受惠於轉單造成銷貨收入擴張，股價大漲出現正向異常報酬。變異數分析結果顯示台灣面板公司面臨訴訟所產生的股價下跌幅度遠大於競爭對手結盟，而三星公司關閉8.5代生產線與友達將生產線自中國移回台灣，台灣面板產業股價上漲幅度無明顯差異。研究結果隱含投資人對司法判決賠償的事件反應最大，其次是對手競爭結盟，而市場對廠商自身產能擴張，反應幅度最小。

This study examines the investor response to international panel leaders' legal incidents or corporate decisions. Negative abnormal returns were observed in Taiwan's panel industry as a result of the judgment against Taiwan's AUO for violating U.S. antitrust laws, the announcement of Beijing Orientation's investment in the second Generation 10.5 (GEN10.5) line in China, and the alliance between South Korea's Samsung and Beijing Orientation. Although Samsung closed down its Generation 8.5 production line and Taiwan's panel industry benefited from expanding sales revenues due to the transfer of orders, the stock prices insignificantly increased in Taiwan's panel industry. The ANOVA analysis reveals that Taiwan panel companies facing litigation experienced a much larger decline in stock price than competitors entering into alliances. An insignificant difference exists in the stock price increase between Samsung's closure of its Generation 8.5 production line and the U.S.-China trade war, which resulted in AUO relocating its production line back to Taiwan from China. The findings imply that investors reacted most to a judicial decision of litigation loss, followed by a rival alliance. In contrast, the market reacted least to the expansion of a manufacturer's own production capacity.