The Role of the Bank of England at Its Foundation: A Mechanism for Showing Trust

英格蘭銀行成立時之角色：一個展現信任的機制

10.29960/SIC.201006.0001

楊德源(Der-Yuan Yang)

Bank of England ； Contra/Eumenes Effect ； Credible Commitment ； Glorious Revolution ； Honor and Trust

國際文化研究

6卷1期（2010 / 06 / 01）

1 - 32

英文

A bank too big to fail may cause chaos and the same applies to a regime too much in debt. The seventeenth century England witnessed the encounter of a deeply indebted government and its singular creditor, the Bank of England. The founding of the Bank altered the crown’s incentives to renege and fiscal discipline was fostered by the Glorious Revolution. If considered as a hostage to facilitate sovereign financing, the Bank was too dear to be spoiled by the crown or Parliament. In contrast, as the Bank and the investors bought into the government debt, they endeavored to support the regime to save themselves. The outcome was a financial revolution that rendered England prosperous and secure.

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