施里芬計畫第一次世界大戰

Shlieffen Plan and the First World War

林挺生(Ting-sheng Lin)

第一次世界大戰 ； 守勢現實主義 ； 戰爭計畫 ； 作戰思想 ； 建構主義 ； First World War ； Defensive Realism ； war plan ； operational thinking ； Constructivism

台灣國際研究季刊

14卷4期（2018 / 12 / 01）

123 - 157

繁體中文

守勢現實主義對第一次世界大戰起因的解釋中，施里芬計畫扮演了連結重要理論概念的核心角色，但這些國際關係研究卻很少對戰爭計畫的本質進行探討。本文從戰略研究層級的角度分析作戰計畫在整個戰爭行為中的位階，質疑用因果模式將施里芬計畫視為攻勢崇拜代表的命題。經由對德國參謀本部正式部署計畫的理解，以及從新發現的軍事檔案中認識到施里芬作戰思想的變化，我們發現攻勢守勢平衡理論不能解釋的問題。本文主張從空間、時間、兵力三個要素相互建構的觀點，來重新檢視德國一戰前作戰思想的演變，並提出從施里芬到小毛奇出現了重要的傳統斷裂，由相信防守優越性轉變成攻勢至上。

In the defensive realist explanation of the cases of the First World War, the Schlieffen Plan served as the linchpin connecting the central concepts, but rare were these International Relations studies' exploration into the nature of war plan (operational plan). This paper adopts the ＂levels of strategic studies＂ perspective in order to analyze the status of operational plan, and questions the thesis that considers the Schlieffen Plan as representative of the cult of offensive within a causal model. Through the understanding of the formal deployment plans devised by German Great General Staff, and of the newly discovered military archives, we find several questions that cannot be explained by the offense-defense balance theory. This article hence proposes a constructivist framework, which focus on the relationship amongst space, time, and force, for reviewing the evolution of German operational thought. We further point out that there was a rupture in terms of operational tradition between Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger, from the belief in defensive superiority toward the fever of attack.

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