题名

The Doha Investment Negotiations: Whither or Wither

并列篇名

杜哈投資協商:往何處?式微乎?

DOI

10.30392/TJWTOS.200608_(4).0002

作者

戴蒙德(W. A. Dymond);哈特(Michael Hart)

关键词

加拿大 ; 世界貿易組織 ; 投資 ; 杜哈回合 ; 雙邊投資協議 ; Canada ; WTO investment ; Doha Round ; BITS

期刊名称

Taiwanese Journal of WTO Studies

卷期/出版年月

4期(2006 / 08 / 01)

页次

57 - 89

内容语文

英文

中文摘要

海外直接投資(FDI)在世界貿易組織的最後兩次部長級會議中得到高度關注。2001年的杜哈回合談判決定將投資談判延至2003年部長級會議。2003年坎昆會議中,投資議題與其他同為新加坡議題的三個項目成為焦點:貿易與競爭政策,促進貿易,政府採購透明化。 從WTO討論投資以來一直假設多邊貿易體系的原則能使建立多邊投資協定更具活力。然而此一假設出現三大問題。其一,這些規則是落實在目的在培養與擴大全球商品貿易的架構下而非專為培養與擴大全球投資流動的架構下。其二,任何WTO投資協定都需與既存的雙邊與區域投資協定有所妥協。其三為實施對發展中國家有利的特別與差別待遇所造成的衝擊。因此,檢驗實踐杜哈發展議程的其他途徑有其必要。 本文旨在探討將投資協定納入世界貿易組織眾多協議中必須決定的目標與主旨。在檢視世界貿易組織於杜哈談判前後的討論內容後,本文將著重於亟待解決的主要議題上。最後,本文將對未來提出建議。 雖然WTO投資協議所追求的目標是健全的,但是此一協議的協商分析與方法卻突顯出嚴重的問題。我們建議各國政府應儘快界定出一個更實際而具生產力的議程。在起跑點上,他們需要承認既存的雙邊協商協定網絡已提供強而有效的機制。WTO的協商應該以補充或強化而非取代此一網絡為目標。此外,各國也需接受一項事實:投資流動並不僅侷限於商品與服務的交換,而是受到各種不同因素與考量的影響。因而需要一套不同的規則與程序維繫,其所需要的機制是不同於商品貿易的。最後,如同在貨品貿易中帶來的無法估計的傷害般,各國政府需承認在投資領域中對開發中國家的特殊和區別對待規則會對這些開發中國家造成重大的傷害。

英文摘要

High drama attended the issue of foreign direct investment (FDI) at the last two ministerial meetings of the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the 2001 meeting in Doha, the inclusion of investment in the mandate for the new round of multilateral trade negotiations became a make-or-break issue. The result was a decision to delay launching investment negotiations until the 2003 ministerial meeting, subject to an explicit consensus on the modalities of negotiations. The scope of the intended negotiations was limited to a narrow range of issues and heavily laden with references to the special development and financial needs of developing countries. At Cancun, investment was treated together with three other issues, trade and competition policy, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement, collectively known as the Singapore issues. At Cancun, the Chairman proposed only a modest step on investment-that the Working Group be mandated to elaborate the negotiating modalities for adoption at a later date. Although the European Union, the principal supporter of WTO investment negotiations, offered to withdraw the proposal, Japan and Korea insisted that at a minimum the Chairman's text be accepted. Developing countries, on the other hand, refused to accept any of the Chairman's proposals on the Singapore issues and, on that point, the meeting terminated. From the outset of investment discussions in the WTO, it has been assumed that the principles of the multilateral trade system can inform the erection of a multilateral investment agreement. Three major issues arise from such an assumption and require examination if the WTO debate is to be joined on a basis likely to yield a coherent result. The first is the architecture of lodging rules designed to foster the expansion of global investment flows within an architecture designed to foster the expansion of global trade in goods. The second is the need to reconcile any WTO investment agreement with existing bilateral and regional investment agreements. The third is the implication of implementing special and differential treatment in favour of developing countries. In short, there are some large gaps in the intellectual capital necessary to launch negotiations.

主题分类 社會科學 > 經濟學
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