Emergency Safeguard Measures on Services: Where to Now?

服務貿易的緊急防衛措施：現在該往何處？

10.30392/TJWTOS.200608_(4).0003

伯斯沃司(Malcolm Bosworth)；克拉格史東(Roy Clogstoum)；崔溫(Ray Trewin)

世界貿易組織 ； 服務貿易總協定 ； 緊急防衛措施服務貿易規則工作小組 ； WTO ； GATS ； ESM ； WPGR

Taiwanese Journal of WTO Studies

4期（2006 / 08 / 01）

91 - 123

英文

服務貿易規則工作小組(WPGR)在討論是否在服務貿易中納入緊急防衛措施(EMS)時，主要著重於可行性與需求性等技術性問題。服務貿易總協定(GATS)第十條要求對奠基於非歧視原則的緊急防衛措施的談判結論需在世界貿易組織成立後（1998年）三年內生效。經過十年後，反對在服務貿易納入緊急防衛措施的國家認為支持者尚未充分表明提出防衛措施的需求性（意願）與技術可行性（含法律與經濟的手段）。反對者宣稱支持者未能解釋清楚此一機制將會如何運作以及該機制所帶來的法律與貿易不確定性更將會阻礙外國投資。此外，考量到此一機制對現存服務貿易協議的安定性帶來的風險，反對緊急防衛措施的國家也質疑此機制是否有需要的必要。 本文作者認為，不將防衛機制擴及服務業將最有利於單純經濟發展。然而在多邊談判中仍有其他因素的考量，例如政治經濟因素。否則，在貨品貿易中亦不會出現防衛保護機制。然而，本文作者仍認為防衛保護機制對貿易自由化帶來的風險極高。即便將政治經濟因素納入考量，服務業的防衛保護機制仍須比目前在貨品貿易中的防衛保護機制受到更大的控制，以免淪為保護主義的工具。 要打破目前對此議題的正反兩方意見帶來的僵局並不容易。本文作者認為，對於強烈支持的國家來說(例如除了新加坡之外的東協國家、巴西與中國等國)，支持服務業防衛保護機制一但成功，會弱化世界貿易組織對國內改革的規範。要避免此結果，唯有更嚴格地限制防衛機制措施使用的時機。到頭來，對於這些現在支持的國家只會帶來少數的實際利益。 作者更建議世界貿易組織會員國將此一思考模式套用至貨品貿易，重新評估防衛保護措施對經濟利益的影響。當世界貿易組織的政治考量高於經濟因素的評估時，多邊架構會變的更笨重、更模糊，從而阻礙世界貿易組織對提升貿易自由化所做的努力。

Discussions in the Working Party on GATS Rules (WPGR) relating to the GATS Article X negotiating mandate on whether to adopt emergency safeguard measures (ESM) for service have largely focused in Geneva on the technical question of feasibility and desirability.2 After a decade, they have now stalemated with ESM demandeurs (the ASEANs now minus Singapore, supported by others, including Brazil and China) calling for conclusion of negotiations as per the mandate and opponents (a group of developed and developing countries) arguing that the supporters of an ESM have yet to adequately demonstrate desirability (willingness) and technical feasibility (legal and economic means) of issuing safeguards. They argue that demandeurs have failed to show how such a mechanism would work in practice, and stress that by creating legal and economic uncertainty ESMs may inhibit foreign investment. Furthermore, ESM opponents are not convinced that such a mechanism is desirable, given the risk that it would undermine the stability of existing services commitments. While discussions in more recent years have become more detailed and refined, diverging views over the various elements have become sharper and more glaring. Deadlines for the ESM negotiation have been repeatedly extended, with the latest, March 2004, indefinitely postponed until the end of the Doha Round. In many respects it is unfortunate that due to the lack of any decisions on GATS rules, particularly ESM, these became embroiled with current services market access negotiations. Several ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei and the Philippines) and Brazil have made their initial offers conditional upon the ”balanced outcome of the DDA negotiations, particularly progress made on Article X negotiations”. In the absence of any multilateral agreement on services safeguards, some ASEAN Members have expressed the wish that services safeguard mechanisms be injected into Free Trade Agreements.

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2. Maljuf, Luis Abugattas(2002).Safeguards in agreements to liberalise trade in services.Report Prepared for the CRNM/IBB Project.
3. Marconini, Mario(2005).Emergency Safeguard Measures in the GATS: Beyond Feasible and Desirable, UNCTAD Document UNCTAD/DITC/TNDC/2005/4.
4. Sauvé, Pierre(2002).Completing the GATS Framework: Addressing Uruguay Round Leftovers, Aussenwirtsghaft, Jahrgang, Heft III.