Security Bound of Biclique Attacks on AES-128

10.6633/IJNS.202103_23(2).12

Xiaoli Dong；Jie Chen

AES ； Biclique ； Block Cipher ； Cryptanalysis

International Journal of Network Security

23卷2期（2021 / 03 / 01）

286 - 295

英文

For two future possible improvements of AES-128: enhanced subkey diffusion property or increased encryption rounds, this paper evaluates the security bound of R-Round AES-128 (R ＞ 10) and 10-Round AES-IND-128 (AES-128 with independent of key schedule) against biclique attack. For attacking R-round AES-128(R ＞ 10), with the increase of several rounds R, the time complexity increases gradually, but it never reaches 2^(127.86), reduced by about 10% compared with brute force. For attacking 10-Round AES-IND-128, a 1-round biclique is firstly constructed, and then the attack is proposed. The time complexity is no more than 2^(127.42), reduced by about 33% compared with brute force.