從賽局理論看地方政府與廠商標案利益分配

Interest-Negotiating Behaviour Between Cocal Government and Business-The Perspeotive of Game Theory

劉綠萍(Lu-Ping Liu)

賽局理論 ； 反應函數 ； 興建－營運－移轉 ； Game theory ； Central government ； Local government ； Budget allocation law

東亞論壇

490期（2015 / 12 / 01）

47 - 56

繁體中文

柯P(Professor)於2014年參加臺北市市長選舉，即以「在野大聯盟」為號召，當選臺北市第15任直轄市市長，成為臺北市改制直轄市後首任無黨籍市長。上任後旋即籌組了「廉政委員會」針對「遠雄大巨蛋」、「美河市」、「太極雙星」、「松山文創園區案」、「三創資訊園區案」等5大標案進行，稽核其中已經揭露個案中合法但是不合理部分，引發談判爭議。本文從賽局理論看政府與廠商標案利益分配問題，試圖解決政府與廠商既成建設，如何分割這塊大餅。結論與建議指出需再修法、競標過程手段透明化，促成談判雙方互蒙其利為原則?

Ke P (Professor) won Taipei mayoral election in 2014, that ＂opposition Grand Alliance＂ for the call, and was elected the 15th Mayor of Taipei. He became the first non-party mayor of Taipei after the restructuring of municipality. Immediately he set up ＂Integrity Committee＂ to target 5 big issue, ＂Far Yuta Dome＂ ＂US Heian City,＂ ＂Tai Chi double star＂, ＂cultural and creative park Matsuyama case＂, ＂Three Parks case record information,＂ etc. Many unnoticed parts have been revealed, but the irrational part of the negotiations might lead to controversy. This study start from game theory to see the allocation of government and factory trademark case interests, try to solve the de facto government and construction firms, and try to understand how to split the piece of the pie. Conclusions and recommendations include the need to amending the law, invading bidding process transparent creating, dynamic consistency strategy.

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