非法競租活動之查緝與社會競租浪費

Investigation of Illegal Rent Seeking Activities and Social Rent Seeking Waste

10.30401/RSS.201304_7(1).0003

翁仁甫(Zen-Fu Ueng)；陳怡安(Yi-An Chen)

競租 ； 犯罪經濟學 ； 查緝 ； 懲罰 ； Rent-seeking ； Criminal economics ； Investigation ； Punishment

社會科學論叢

7卷1期（2013 / 04 / 01）

79 - 98

繁體中文

本文藉由結合傳統競租分析以及犯罪經濟學的相關概念，建構了一個合法與非法競租活動並存的競租分析架構，利用此一模型，我們探究政府司法部門調整其對於非法競租行為的查緝與懲罰強度，將如何影響整體社會競租浪費水準。結果發現：政府司法部門加強對於非法競租活動的查緝，或是提高對於非法競租活動的罰金倍數，在本文所提出之充分條件成立下，將會使得整體社會競租浪費水準提高而非下降。

This paper combines the concepts of traditional rent-seeking theory and criminal economics to establish a model of rent seeking which takes the coexistence of legal and illegal rent seeking activities into consideration. Using this model, we analyze how judicial investigation and scale of punishment of illegal rent seeking activities will affect social rent seeking waste. Our findings show that the strengthening of government investigation or punishment of illegal rent seeking activities will increase rather than decrease social rent seeking waste, provided that the sufficient condition proposed by this paper is satisfied.

1. Allard, Richard J.(1988).Rent-seeking with non-identical players.Public Choice,57(1),3-14.
2. Allingham, Michael G.,Sandmo, Agnar(1972).Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis.Journal of Public Economics,1(3-4),323-338.
3. Baik, Kyung Hwan(1994).Effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players.Southern Economic Journal,61(2),367-378.
4. Becker, Gary S.(1968).Crime and punishment: An economic approach.Journal of Political Economy,76(2),169-217.
5. Bouckaert, Boudewijn(ed.),De Geest, Gerrit(ed.)(2000).Encyclopedia of law and economics.
6. Buchanan, James M.(ed.),Tollison, Robert D.(ed.),Tullock, Gordon(ed.)(1980).Toward a theory of the rentseeking society.College Station:Texas A&M University Press.
7. Buchanan, James M.(ed.),Tollison, Robert D.(ed.),Tullock, Gordon(ed.)(1980).Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society.College Station:Texas A&M University Press.
8. Congleton, Roger D.,Hillman, Arye L.,Conrad, Kai A.(2008).Forty years of research on rent seeking.Heidelberg:Springer.
9. Ehrlich, Isaac(1973).Participation in illegitimate activities: A theoretical and empirical investigation.Journal of Political Economy,81(3),521-565.
10. Hillman, Arye L.,Riley, John G.(1989).Politically contestable rents and transfers.Economics and Politics,1(1),17-39.
11. Katz, Eliakim,Nitzan, Shmuel,Rosenberg, Jacob(1990).Rent-seeking for pure public goods.Public Choice,65(1),49-60.
12. Kohli, Inderjit,Singh, Nirvikar(1999).Rent seeking and rent setting with asymmetric effectiveness of lobbying.Public Choice,99(3-4),275-298.
13. Krueger, Anne O.(1974).The political economy of rent-seeking society.American Economic Review,64(3),291-303.
14. Leininger, Wolfgang(1993).More efficient rent-seeking-A Munchhausen solution.Public Choice,75(1),43-62.
15. Rogerson, William P.(1982).The social costs of monopoly and regulation: A gametheoretic analysis.Bell Journal of Economics,13(2),391-401.
16. Serge-Christophe, Kolm(1973).A note on optimal tax evasion.Journal of Public Economics,2(3),265-270.
17. Singh, Balbir(1973).Making honesty the best policy.Journal of Public Economics,2(3),257-263.
18. Stein, William E.(2002).Asymmetric rent-seeking with more than two contestants.Public Choice,113(3-4),325-336.
19. Tullock, Gordon(1967).The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolists and theft.Western Economic Journal,5(3),224-232.

1. 翁仁甫、洪一銘(2016)。納入隱匿產出策略的生產衝突競租模型。社會科學論叢，10(2)，37-60。