题名

聯合行為寬恕政策之跨國比較

并列篇名

The Cross-Country Comparison of Leniency Policy

DOI

10.30401/RSS.201604_10(1).0003

作者

王智賢(Jue-Shyan Wang);侯文婷(Wen-Ting Hou);林玫吟(Mei-Yin Lin)

关键词

寬恕政策 ; 反托拉斯 ; 卡特爾 ; 聯合行為 ; 子賽局完全均衡 ; Leniency Policy ; Antitrust ; Cartel ; Concerted Action ; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

期刊名称

社會科學論叢

卷期/出版年月

10卷1期(2016 / 04 / 01)

页次

65 - 87

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

聯合行為的存在,可能會傷害市場的競爭公平,因此,各國紛紛制定反壟斷政策,以打擊聯合行為。寬恕政策便是其中一種方法,而其效果為何,是本文所要探討的重點。本文延伸Silbye(2012)之設定,建立反托拉斯法主管機關開始調查前及開始調查後兩個階段的賽局基本模型。先將台灣、日本、歐盟、美國四個經濟體的寬恕政策法規內容應用至基本模型裡,並得出各階段之下廠商所會採取的子賽局完全均衡。本研究發現,美國的寬恕政策,最能促進廠商提早申報誘因。

英文摘要

The cartels may injure the fairness of market competition and most of the authorities around the world have implemented Antitrust Law to eliminate them. The leniency policy is a regulation which can eliminate the cartels. The purpose of this article is to investigate the effect of this policy. We extend the model of Silbye (2012) and establish a two-stage game theoretical model. The first stage is before the beginning of antitrust authority's detection, and the second stage is after the beginning of antitrust authority's detection. First, we apply the leniency policy in Taiwan, Japan, the U.S.A. and the E.U. into the basic model. And then we get the subgame perfect equilibrium of firms in each stage. We find the leniency policy in the U.S.A. has the most effective impact on promoting the incentive of the firms to report early.

主题分类 社會科學 > 社會科學綜合
社會科學 > 社會學
社會科學 > 經濟學
参考文献
  1. Blum, U.,Steinat, N.,Veltins, M.(2008).On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis.European Journal of Law and Economics,25(3),209-229.
  2. Hamaguchi, Y.,Kawagoe, T.,Shibata, A.(2009).Group size effects on cartel formation and the enforcement power of leniency programs.International Journal of Industrial Organization,27(2),145-165.
  3. Harrington, J. E.(2006).Corporate leniency programs and the role of the antitrust authority in detecting collusion.International Symposium on "Towards an Effective Im-plementation of New Competition Policy",:
  4. Park, S.(2014).The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion.Economics Letters,122(2),326-330.
  5. Silbye, F.(2012).A note on antitrust damages and leniency programs.European Journal of Law and Economics,33(3),691-699.
  6. 王銘勇(2006)。聯合行為寬恕減免責任條款之研究。公平交易季刊,14(1),75-133。
  7. 楊銘宏(2008)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。中原大學財經法律學系。
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  9. 顏廷棟(2012)。聯合行為之執法檢討與展望。公平交易季刊,20(4),1-52。
被引用次数
  1. (2020)。寬恕政策實施之三階段賽局有效性分析。臺灣銀行季刊,71(4),100-133。