納入隱匿產出策略的生產衝突競租模型

Production and Conflict Rent-Seeking Model with Hidden Output

10.30401/RSS.201610_10(2).0002

翁仁甫(Zen-Fu Ueng)；洪一銘(Yi-Ming Hong)

生產衝突模型 ； 競租 ； Production and conflict model ； Rent seeking

社會科學論叢

10卷2期（2016 / 10 / 01）

37 - 60

繁體中文

鑒於過往的競租文獻，忽略了個別競租者可以同時使用多種不同方式來相互競逐利益的可能性，同時參酌Hausken（2012）有關於進行涉及生產層面問題的競租分析時，宜選用生產衝突模型為討論架構的建議。本文藉由調整生產衝突模型的部分設定，在個人面對資源限制下，除了可以將有限的資源配置於生產和競租活動以外，還可選擇將部分資源投入隱匿產出逐利活動的情況下，建立一個納入隱匿產出策略的生產衝突競租模型來從事競租分析。分析結果發現，政府提高對於隱匿產出活動的查緝以及懲罰強度，將導致產出隱匿水準的下降以及均衡競租投入水準的提高，同時均衡產出水準、個人效用以及社會福利水準則是會因此降低。本文的上述分析發現顯示，在我們所建立的生產衝突競租分析架構下，當政府當局基於抑制非法活動、維護公平正義或其他理由而提高對於產出隱匿活動的查緝以及懲罰強度時，就效率觀點而言，反而會導致個人效用與社會福利水準因為此一變動而降低。

Previous papers on rent-seeking tend to overlook the possibility that individual rent seeker can seek rent by many different devices. As suggested by Hausken (2012), the production and conflict model is a better choice to analyze rent seeking activities pertaining to production. This paper adjusts the setup of ordinary production and conflict model. We establish a production and conflict rent-seeking model with hidden output to conduct the rent-seeking analysis. We find that the strengthening of authority investigation or punishment of illegal output hiding activities will decrease output hiding level, increase rent seeking input, and at the same time decrease individual output, utility and social welfare. Our finding shows that the strengthening of authority investigation or punishment of illegal output hiding activities aiming to restrain illegal activities or maintain justice will have negative impact on individual utility and social welfare.

1. 翁仁甫、陳怡安(2013)。非法競租活動之查緝與社會競租浪費。社會科學論叢，7(1)，79-98。
   連結：
2. Allingham, Michael G.,Sandmo, Agnar(1972).Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis.Journal of Public Economics,1(3&4),323-338.
3. Becker, Gary S.(1968).Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.Journal of Political Economy,76(2),169-217.
4. Bouckaert, Boudewijn(ed.),De Geest, Gerrit (ed.)(2000).Encyclopedia of law and economics.Cheltenham:Edward Elgar.
5. Buchanan, James M.(ed.),Tollison, Robert D.(ed.),Tullock, Gordon(ed.)(1980).Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society.College Station:Texas A&M University Press.
6. Congleton, Roger D.,Hillman, Arye L.,Conrad, Kai A.(2008).Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking.Heidelberg:Springer.
7. Congleton, Roger D.,Hillman, Arye L.,Conrad, Kai A.(2008).Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking.Heidelberg:Springer.
8. Ehrlich, Isaac(1973).Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation.Journal of Political Economy,81(3),521-565.
9. Grossman, Herschel I.,Kim, Minseong(1995).Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property.Journal of Political Economy,103(6),1275-1288.
10. Hausken, Kjell(2012).On the Inappropriateness of Collective Rent Seeking Analysis When Agents Exert Within-Group and Between-Group Efforts.Economics letters,116(3),504-507.
11. Hausken, Kjell(2005).Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models.Public Choice,123(1),59-93.
12. Krueger, Anne O.(1974).The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Society.American Economic Review,64(3),291-303.
13. Nitzan, Shmuel(1991).Rent-Seeking with Non-Identical Sharing Rules.Public Choice,71(1),43-50.
14. Nitzan, Shmuel(1991).Collect Rent Dissipation.Economic Journal,101(409),1522-1534.
15. Noh, Suk Jae(1999).A General Equilibrium Model of Two Group Conflict with Endogenous Intra-Group Sharing Rules.Public Choice,98(3),251-267.
16. Posner, Richard. A.(1975).The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation.Journal of Political Economy,83(4),807-827.
17. Serge-Christophe, Kolm(1973).A Note on Optimal Tax Evasion.Journal of Public Economics,2(3),265-270.
18. Singh, Balbir(1973).Making Honesty the Best Policy.Journal of Public Economics,2(3),257-263.
19. Skaperdas, Stergios(1992).Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights.The American Economic Review,82(4),720-739.
20. Tullock, Gordon(1967).The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolists and Theft.Western Economic Journal,5(3),224-232.