以擁擠性公共財為競逐標的之二維度競租分析

Two-Dimensional Rent-Seeking for Congested Public Goods

10.30401/RSS.202206_16(1).0002

陳連欽(Lian-Chin Chen)；翁仁甫(Zen-Fu Ueng)

擁擠性公共財 ； 二維度競租 ； Congested public goods ； Two-dimensional rent-seeking

社會科學論叢

16卷1期（2022 / 06 / 01）

39 - 68

繁體中文

透過結合Faria et al.（2014）的二維度競租投入模型以及Edwards（1990）擁擠性公共財分析架構之設定方式，本文建立了一個標的為擁擠性地方公共財的二維度競租分析模型。利用本文所建立的模型，我們深入分析地區居民人數分配狀況、地區居民人數、擁擠參數以及擴大租利努力投入影響效果參數等因素變動，對於二維度競租活動所可能產生的影響效果。有別於Katz et al.（1990）的公共財競租分析有關於：競租活動不受地區居民人數以及地區人數分配狀況影響的分析結論。本文發現在競租標的公共財存在擁擠性的情況下，總擴大租利與總相互競租兩個維度的努力投入水準，都會隨著兩個地區間的人數分配趨向越來越不平均而增加。又當兩個區域居民人數等比例提高時，總擴大租利與總相互競租兩個維度的努力投入水準，則是都會因此而降低。

By referring to the two-dimensional rent-seeking model in Faria et al. (2014) and the model of Congested public goods proposed by Edwards (1990). We construct a model of two-dimensional rent-seeking for congested public goods. Using our model, we investigate the impact of population, population distribution, congestion parameter and elasticity of central government grants on two-dimensional rent-seeking activities. Different from traditional public goods rent-seeking studies' finding about the population and population distribution will not affect rent-seeking waste. Our finding shows that the more uneven population distribution, the higher social waste will cause by two-dimensional rent-seeking activities. Moreover, when regional population increase in the same proportion, the social waste of two-dimensional rent-seeking activities will decrease.

1. Bergstrom, T. C.,Goodman, R. P.(1973).Private demands for public goods.American Economic Review,63,280-296.
2. Borcherding, T. E.,Deacon, R. T.(1972).The demand for the services of non-federal governments.American Economic Review,62,891-901.
3. Cheikbossian, G.(2008).Rent-seeking, spillovers and the benets of decentralization.Journal of Urban Economics,63,217-228.
4. Congleton, R. D.,Hillman, A. L.,Conrad, K. A.(2008).Forty years of research on rent seeking.Heidelberg:Springer.
5. Congleton, R. D.,Hillman, A. L.,Conrad, K. A.(2008).Forty years of research on rent seeking.Heidelberg:Springer.
6. Edwards, J. H. Y.(1990).Congestion function specication and the publicness of local public goods.Journal of Urban Economics,27,80-96.
7. Faria, J. R.,Mixon, F. J.,Caudill, S. B.,Wineke, S. J.(2014).Two-dimensional effort in patent-race games and rent-seeking contests: the case of telephony.Games,5,116-126.
8. Feidler, J.,Staal, K.(2012).Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods.Economics of Governance,13,73-93.
9. Katz, E.,Nitzan, S.,Rosenberg, J.(1990).Rent-seeking for pure public goods.Public Choice,65,49-60.
10. Koethenbuerger, M.(2008).Revisiting the “decentralization theorem”—on the role of externalities.Journal of Urban Economics,64,116-122.
11. Krueger, A. O.(1974).The political economy of rent-seeking society.American Economic Review,64,291-303.
12. Means, T. S.,Mehay, S. L.(1995).Estimation the publicness of local government services: alternative congestion function specifications.Southern Economic Journal,61,614-627.
13. Nupia, O.(2013).Rent Seeking for Pure Public Goods: Wealth and Group’s Size Heterogeneity.Economics and Politics,25,495-514.
14. Posner, R. A.(1975).The social cost of monopoly and regulation.Journal of Political Economy,83,807-827.
15. Riaz, K.,Shogren, J. F.,Johnson, S. R.(1995).A general model of rent seeking for public goods.Public Choice,82,243-259.
16. Tullock, G.(1967).The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft.Western Economic Journal,5,224-232.
17. Tullock, G.(1980).Efficient rent seeking.Towards a theory of rent-seeking society,College Station:
18. Ursprung, H. W.(1990).Public goods, rent dissipation, and candidate competition.Economics and Politics,2,115-132.
19. 翁仁甫(2006)。標的為擁擠性公共財的競租分析。經社法治論叢，38，211-238。