哈澈遜的道德感倫理學與康德早期的倫理學

Hutcheson's Ethics of Moral Sense and Kant's Early Ethics

10.29699/FJPS.200307.0003

張雪珠(Hsüeh-Chu Chang)

道德感 ； 康德 ； 哈澈遜 ； moral sence ； Kant ； Hutcheson

哲學論集

36期（2003 / 07 / 01）

103 - 132

繁體中文

康德的倫理學曾受到哈澈遜(Francis Hutcheson, 1694-1746)的「感覺倫理學」的影響，是無異議的，因為這是康德自己在他於一七六二年寫成的作品中，即《自然神學與倫理原理清晰度研究》(”Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsäze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral”)(1762)-即學者們所稱的《獎作》(”Preisschrift”)-清楚表示的。他先是提到：「今天人開始了解到，想像真理的官能是知識，感受善的官能則是感覺，兩者不該混淆。」(KGS Ⅱ 299)1藉此他將哈澈遜的道德感倫理學概念引入他自己的倫理學，隨後還提名道出哈澈遜的「道德感」(das moralische Gefühl)。(KGS Ⅱ 300)至於康德是在什麼時候認識到哈澈遜的倫理學著作的呢？對於這個問題，從既有的質料我們無法獲知確切的答案。在哈曼(Hamann)於1759年7月27日寫給康德的一封信中，曾出現休謨(D. Hume)的名字。(KGS Ⅹ15)而且，從他被提及的方式來看，他對於康德來講，應當不是個陌生的名字。但是哈澈遜是否此時也是康德已知的一個名字呢？則不得而知。不過在此之前，我們找到一個機會，可以合理地推測，康德很有可能在那個時候已接觸到哈澈遜和其他的英國的倫理學學者的思想的。這個機會就是在1756年的冬季，這時他應當開始準備倫理學的授課課程。因此，席爾普(P. Arthur Schilpp)和史慕克(Josef Schmucker)一致認為，康德接觸哈澈遜的倫理學，最遲在五十年代的末葉，不過，應當也可以推到五十年代中葉。2 但是對於哈澈遜的思想，康德從非無條件的全盤接受3，也不是一直地停留在他的思想影響之下。在他於一七七0年所寫的《論感性世界與理性世界之形式與原理》(”De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis”)-即所謂的《正教授論文》(”Dissertation”)4-中，康德已經明白表示，「薩夫得斯布利和他的追隨者」(Shaftesbury et Asseclae)的感覺倫理學，應當可以「極其合理地受到譴責」(summo iure reprehenditur)。(KGS Ⅱ 396,§9)「薩夫得斯布利和他的追隨者」的這個說法，已經把哈澈遜也給包括進去了；因為哈澈遜的倫理學走的正是前者的感覺倫理學的路線。在這裡值得注意的是，康德在《正教授論文》中反駁哈澈遜倫理學之觀點的理由，與他在八年前的《獎作》中承認哈澈遜為他在倫理學上的一個「前輩」的理由(KGS Ⅱ 300)，正是相同的，即都由於感覺倫理學的理論的原故。要說明這種前後不一的狀況，可以有兩種的可能性。第一種可能性是，假定感覺倫理學的基本概念不變，即所謂的「道德感」(das moralische Gefühl; moral sense)的意義不變。但是在這種情況之下也必須假定康德前後自我矛盾；然而這不是我們對康德理應當持有的先見立場。第二種的可能性是，「道德感」的意義先後 有了改變。這個改變，或是來自哈澈遜，或是發生在康德本人。但是哈澈遜己在1746 年去世了，所以「道德感」意義的變化只能來自康德自己。事實上，康德對「道德感」的詮釋，從來不是與哈澈遜的瞭解完完全全相同的。這也就是席爾普一而再所強調的：承認來自英國人的道德感的影響，不就意謂著與英國人所講的道德感完全一樣。5而且，事實上在不同的著作中，康德自己對「道德感」的詮釋也不盡相同。這就造成了一種可能性，康德在他自己倫理學的發展之下，對於感覺倫理學的立場有了改變的必要，最後必須反駁他自己先前所接納的這個理論，因為這時他對「道德感」的詮釋與他的倫理學思想，已亙不相容。 我們在下文先提出哈澈遜的「道德感」倫理學，然後討論康德在早期不同著作中對於「道德感」的不同詮釋。

It is agreed that Kant's ethics was influenced by Hutcheson's (1694-1746) ”ethics of feeling,” as Kant made it clear in his work Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsäze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral in 1762-Preisschrift, as scholars called. He first mentioned, ”People begin to realize today that the sense to imagine the truth is knowledge, and the sense to feel the good is feeling; the two senses shouldn't be confused” (KGS Ⅱ 299). In this way, he brought Hutcheson's concept of the ethics of moral sense into his own ethics and subsequently named Hutcheson's moral sense (das moralische Gefühl, KGS Ⅱ 300). As to when Kant was introduced to Hutcheson's ethical works, we can't find any definitive answers from the existing materials. In Hamann's letter to Kant on July 27(superscript th), 1759, we find the name D. Hume (KGS Ⅹ 15). From how the name was mentioned, Kant was not supposed to be unfamiliar with Hume's name, though it's not clear whether Hutcheson was also a name that Kant was acquainted with. But there was an occasion where we can reasonably infer that Kant very likely had learned about the thoughts of Hutcheson and other English ethicians. It happened in the winter of 1756, when he was supposed to be preparing for the program of ethics. Therefore, both P. Arthur Schilpp and Josef Schmucker agree that Kant must have learned about Hutcheson's ethics as late as the late fifties or as early as the middle fifties. Yet Kant neither accepted all of Hutcheson's thoughts unconditionally nor stayed under his impact all the time. In his De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis in 1770-the so-called Dissertation-Kant noted clearly that Shaftesbury and his followers' (Shaftesbury et Asseclae's) ethics of feeling should be reasonably reprehended (summo iure reprehenditur) (KGS Ⅱ 396, §9). In the phrase ”Shaftesbury et Asseclae,” Hutcheson was included, as his ethics followed the line of Shaftesbury's ethics of feeling. Here it's worth noting that the reasons Kant offered to rebut Hutcheson's ethics in Dissertation were the same as those he claimed eight years ago in Preisschrift to acknowledge Hutcheson as his ”precursor” (KGS Ⅱ 300), whch was attributed to the theory about the ethics of feeling. There are two possible explanations to this inconsistency. First, we assume that the fundamental concept of the ethics of feeling was the same, that is, the meaning of ”moral sense” was unchanged. But in this case we must assume as well that Kant was inconsistent; yet this is not the rightful position we should take toward Kant. The second possible explanation is that the meaning of ”moral sense” was changed later on. This change came either from Hutcheson or Kant himself. But while Hutcheson died in 1746, the change in the meaning of ”moral sense” must be attributed to Kant himself. As a matter of fact, Kant's interpretation of ”moral sense” was never exactly the same as Hutcheson's understanding, which is what P. A. Schilpp stresses repeatedly: acknowledging the influence from English ethicians' concept of moral sense doesn’t necessarily mean Kant’s moral sense was identical to theirs; besides, Kant's interpretations about ”moral sense” actually varied in different writings. This fact made it possible that Kant perceived, with the development of his own ethics, his position to the ethics of feeling needed to be modified and in the end rebutted the theory he accepted earlier, since his interpretation about ”moral sense” and his ethical thoughts at this time were incompatible. In this paper, we first describe Hutcheson's ethics of moral sense and then discuss Kant's different interpretations about ”moral sense” in various early writings.

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