知擇與致知─兩種中國古代的知識論

Noticing the Need to Select a Proper Way of Life and Becoming Able to Do Things in a Proper Way: Two Aspects of Knowledge Theory in Ancient China

10.29699/FJPS.201107.0003

蔡錦昌(Kam-Cheong Choi)

知識論 ； 中國古代思想 ； 「氣」思考方式 ； 知擇 ； 致知 ； knowledge theory ； Chinese ancient thought ； mode ofthinking of "qi" ； noticing the need to select a proper way of life ； becoming able to do things in a proper way

哲學論集

44期（2011 / 07 / 01）

95 - 116

繁體中文

西方形上學是「存有論的形上學」，所以講真假和有對錯的「知識」問題特別重要，可以說是「剛性知識論」。中國形上學則是「調氣論的形上學」，所以講真假和有對錯的「知識」問題沒那麼重要，反而是講得當與否的策略性「知識」比較重要，故此只可以說是「柔性知識論」或者「策略知識論」。如果說西方「知識」的重點在得其「方法」，則中國「知識」的重點在得其「心法」。「心法」是一些能引生得當作用的「竅門」。傳統中國人所謂「知」，本來就不是現代西方所謂“knowledge”。「知識」一詞是個日語漢字譯詞，並非道地中文。在活在一個「氣」世界中的中國古賢眼中，人情之事全與「知道如何處置應對」有關。此種「知」有兩種主要用法。其一是「知擇其道」之「知」；其二是「致知其道」之「知」。「知擇其道」主要分為「知求」和「善假」兩種。「知求」指「知求本有之貴者」；「善假」則是「善假於有用之物」。此二者，每位先秦古賢皆有其偏好。大致來講，孟子、莊子、公孫龍屬於前者；荀子、老子、墨子、韓非、惠施屬於後者。儒道兩家雖然在關於道德運用的心法上正好相反－儒家正面講，道家則側面講－但是兩家都認為事物有其「常」性，致知就是為了能「知常」。與儒道兩家致知論對反的是名、墨、法三家的「取故」之論。名家察名、墨家尚同，法家重法，三家容有不同，但是他們全都認為事物之關鍵在於其是非利害之故實，故此致知就是為了能「取故」，亦即在是非利害之取決上能持之有故而言之成理。

Western metaphysics is ”metaphysics of Being,” hence the problem of true and false is very important for its knowledge theory, while Chinese metaphysics is ”metaphysics of qi (氣),” hence the problem of true and false is not an issue so important as that of acting properly. If we call the Western knowledge theory as ”hard knowledge theory,” then the Chinese one could be called as ”soft knowledge theory,” meaning that it is ”the knowledge theory of the tactics.” If the focal point of the Western style ”knowledge” is in its ”method,” then that of Chinese style ”knowledge” is in its ”strategic key point” or ”knack.”It aims at making one do the proper things and inducing the apt functions from a situation.The sense of the traditional Chinese word ”zhi” (知) is not equal to the English word ”know.” So-called ”knowledge” (知識) in modern Chinese is also originally a Japanese translation term in Chinese characters, not a genuine Chinese one. In the eyes of the Chinese ancients living in a world full of ”qi” things, all the human affairs were naturally related to ”knowing how to handle things properly and wisely.” (知其所當) There are two aspects of main usages of ”zhi” which are distinguishable in most of works in Pre-Qin Period. The first one is ”noticing the need to select a proper way of life,”(知擇) which can also be distinguished furthermore into the following two kinds: ”knowing the importance of seeking for one's lost precious” and ”knowing the importance of choosing the useful things for oneself.” Between the two every Pre-Chin Philosopher has his own choice. Generally speaking, Mencius (孟子), Zhuangzi (莊子), and GongSun Long (公孫龍) belong to the former; while Xunzi (荀子), Laozi (老子), Mozi (墨子), Hanfei (韓非), and Hueishi (惠施) belong to the latter.The second aspect of main usages of ”zhi” in Pre-Qin Period is ”becoming able to do things in a proper way.” (致知) Although being just opposite on the ”strategic key point” or ”knack,” one approaching ”in front” while the other ”in flank,” about the usage of ”Daode” (道德), both Confucians (儒家) and Taoists (道家) are inclined to train themselves becoming able to live harmoniously with ”the constant rhythm” (常性) of the cosmos. Contrarily, the Sophists (名家), the Legalists (法家), and the Mohists (墨家), though approaching ”Daode” in different ways one another, they all think the ”strategic key point” or ”knack” of dealing with things is the ”factual cause” (故實), deeming that only it can help them realize what they plan to realize.

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