董事會特性是否抑制盈餘管理行為－以淨值門檻為例

The Effects of Board Characteristics on Earnings Management-- An Empirical Research Based on Thresholds of Equity Per Share

劉毅馨(Yi-Hsin Liu)；陳盈均(Ying-Jun Chen)；劉倢君(Chieh-Chun Liu)；謝惠如(Hui-Ru Hsieh)；曹雅淳(Ya-Chun Tsao)；葉芸孜(Yun-Tzu Yeh)；林宛瑩(Wang-Ying Lin)；陳委琮(Wei-Cong Chen)

淨值門檻 ； 盈餘管理 ； 董事會特性 ； Thresholds of equity per share ； Earnings management ； Board haracteristics

美和學報

36卷2期（2018 / 05 / 01）

15 - 34

繁體中文

2009年起證券主管機關規定，第一季季報和去年年報的每股淨值均低於10元之公司，將暫停其股票融資、融券交易，以增加對投資人的保障。自2002年起要求新上市櫃公司，至少選任2名獨立董事，以強化公司治理。本研究利用2009年至2015年台灣上市上櫃公司資料，利用直方分配圖與z檢定來檢驗企業是否有盈餘管理現象，以二元logistic迴歸分析檢驗董事會特性對盈餘管理之影響。實證結果發現，公司確實存在著想跨越淨值10元之門檻而從事盈餘管理的行為。董事會特性分析結果顯示，董事持股比例對應計項目盈餘管理有顯著正向之影響，意即董事持股比例越大，公司出現盈餘向上管理的現象愈多。但是，當董事會自願聘請獨立董事時，較少發生盈餘管理行為。

According to the regulation by Financial Supervisory Commission, R.O.C., effective since 2009, corporations with equity per share under NT$10 in financial reports both of first quarter and the previous fiscal year, would suspend its margin purchase and short, in order to increase the protection of investors. Since 2002, the initial public company should invite at least 2 independent board directors to strengthen corporate governance. This study utilizes the data of listed companies in Taiwan from 2009 to 2015. By constructing histograms as graphical tools and performing z statistical tests, we were able to examine the existence of earnings management. The effect of board characteristics on earnings management was examined by binary logistic regression analysis. The empirical results showed that the companies indeed engage in earnings management in order to leap over the NT$10 threshold of equity per share. The results of board characteristics analysis showed that the directors' shareholding ratio posed a significant positive impact on the frequency of manipulating discretionary accruals. Explicitly, the greater the directors' ownership, the more likely there will be upward earnings manipulation. However, when the board voluntarily invites independent directors, less earnings management behavior occurs.

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